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Abstract
This paper sets out a predicative response to the Russell-Myhill paradox of propo-
sitions within the framework of Church’s intensional logic. A predicative response
places restrictions on the full comprehension schema, which asserts that every formula
determines a higher-order entity. In addition to motivating the restriction on the com-
prehension schema from intuitions about the stability of reference, this paper contains
a consistency proof for the predicative response to the Russell-Myhill paradox. The
models used to establish this consistency also model other axioms of Church’s inten-
sional logic that have been criticized by Parsons and Klement: this, it turns out, is due
to resources which also permit an interpretation of a fragment of Gallin’s intensional
logic. Finally, the relation between the predicative response to the Russell-Myhill para-
dox of propositions and the Russell paradox of sets is discussed, and it is shown that
the predicative conception of set induced by this predicative intensional logic allows
one to respond to the Wehmeier problem of many non-extensions.
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1 Introduction
The Russell-Myhill paradox is a paradox about propositions which is structurally analogous
to the Russell paradox about sets. While predicativity has been well-explored as a response
to the Russell paradox about sets, it seems that there has been no attempt to set out and
analyze a predicative response to the Russell-Myhill paradox. The primary aim of this
paper is to do just that. The crucial idea behind the predicativity response is to restrict the
comprehension schema for the ambient higher-order logic. Intuitively, the comprehension
schema says that every well-formed formula determines a higher-order entity. Besides the
burden of showing formal consistency, a predicative response to the Russell-Myhill paradox
must provide at least the beginnings of an account of why some but not all formulas succeed
in determining higher-order entities.
The resulting formal system whose consistency we establish is centered around the
intensional logic of Church. This intensional logic has a neutral core which we exposit in §2;
it is neutral in the sense that its axioms are comparatively undemanding and consistent with
contemporary theorizing based on possible-world semantics. In the subsequent §3, we set out
a formalized version of the Russell-Myhill paradox, which is broadly similar to formalizations
offered by Anderson and Klement, and we describe how different models offered by Kaplan
and Anderson block different premises in the formalized version of the paradox. Then in
§§4-5, we turn to and discuss the predicativity response to the Russell-Myhill paradox. In
addition to discussing the philosophical motivations for predicative restrictions, we establish
the formal consistency of the system by constructing a series of models.
However, the models offered here validate an additional axiom of Church’s intensional
logic which, as Parsons and Klement have emphasized, is in some ways contrary to the
spirit of a fine-grained theory of propositions. In §6 we explain why this axiom holds on our
models: it turns out that this is related to an expressive resource which allows these models to
interpret a fragment of Gallin’s intensional logic. Finally, in §7, we present one application of
a broadly predicative perspective on the Russell-Myhill paradox about propositions, namely
a response to the Wehmeier problem of many non-extensions that arises in connection to the
naive conception of set found in Frege’s Grundgesetze.
This paper is the second in a series of three papers – the other two being [94], [93]– which
collectively constitute a sequel to the “Basic Law V” component of our earlier paper [92]. In
the companion paper [94], we use Go¨del’s constructible sets to study how much of Zermelo-
Fraenkel set theory can be consistently realized in these fragments of the Grundgesetze. In
the complementary paper [93], we examine the deductive strength of a related theory of
abstraction principles.
However, these papers do not touch the question of whether the models used to prove
consistency of the Grundgesetze system are anything like intended models. In §5 of this paper,
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we use Go¨del’s constructible sets to produce models of our extension of Church’s intensional
logic. Our response to the problem of many non-extensions in §7 involves showing how this
extension of Church’s intensional logic can define a model of Frege’s Grundgesetze system. In
addition to articulating a predicative response to the Russell-Myhill paradox of propositions,
this paper suggests the possibility of viewing the consistent fragments of Frege’s naive set
theory through the lens of a consistent version of Church’s intensional logic. However, despite
these connections to our earlier papers, this paper has been written so that one need not
have read these other papers. At one point in §5 below, we reference the earlier paper
[94] for examples of one of our defined notions in this paper (namely that of an intensional
hierarchy (5.9)). However, this is the only respect in which this paper depends on the earlier
papers.
2 The Neutral Core of Church’s Intensional Logic
The intensional logic of Church is an attempt to axiomatize Frege’s sense-reference distinc-
tion. Of course, Frege thought that words not only designate their referent, but also express
their sense. Hence, on Frege’s view, our words bear two semantic relations to non-linguistic
entities, namely they bear the designation relation to their referents and they bear the ex-
pression relation to their senses. In the crudest of terms, Frege is a semantic dualist. This
of course allowed him to say how “the morning star” differs in meaning from the “evening
star”: while these two linguistic expressions refer to the same planet, they express different
senses.
In our view, Church’s crucial observation was that semantic dualism induces a canonical
non-semantic relation. The semantic dualist doesn’t only think that there are more word-
world connections, but they are also committed to an additional world-world relation. In
the case of Frege, the commitment is to a relationship between the abstract Fregean sense
expressed by a linguistic expression and the entity (perhaps a planet) which is denoted by
that linguistic expression. This relation is called the presentation relation in the literature
([54] p. 155), and one says that sense s presents denotation d and one writes ∆(s, d) precisely
in the circumstance where there is a linguistic expression which expresses s and denotes d.
The “triangle” notation ∆ for the presentation relation is helpful here because it reminds us
that a sense s on the bottom-left of the triangle stands in the presentation relation ∆(s, d)
to the denotation d on the bottom-right of the triangle in virtue of its semantic relations to
some suppressed linguistic expression standing at the top of the triangle.
Church proceeded by axiomatizing the presentation relationship. Of course, this is not
the only way that one might seek to understand the presentation relationship. With respect
to a given formal language, we know how to recursively define a satisfaction relation in
terms of reference, and one might have thought that one ought to proceed similarly with
the presentation relationship. However, this procedure would require the notion of sense
to be as conceptually transparent as the notion of reference. By contrast, Church’s own
aim in axiomatizing the presentation relationship was to dissipate outright skepticism about
Fregean sense. Here is how Church put the point in a 1943 review of a paper of Quine:
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There remains the important task, which has never been approached, of con-
structing a formalized semantical system which shall take account of both kinds
of meaning, the relation between a name and its denotation, and the relation
between a name and its sense. [. . . ] [¶] [. . . ] Ultimately it is only on the basis
of their inclusion in an adequate system of this kind that such otherwise inde-
fensibly vague ideas as ‘understanding’ of an expression, ‘attribute,’ ‘objectiver
Inhalt des Denkens,’ may be regarded as logically significant ([13] p. 47).
Hence one of the original aims of Church’s work was to produce a formal theory whose
quantifiers ranged over Fregean senses and which thus serve to implicitly define the notion
of Fregean sense.
The first component of Church’s formal theory concerned the Fregean doctrine that
sense determines reference. Frege tells us that whenever two linguistic expressions have the
same sense, then if one refers then the other does too and they have the same referent.
When put this way, it automatically suggests the following axiom (Church’s Axiom 17, cf.
[15] p. 19, [52] pp. 108-109, [1] p. 220; [2] Axiom C8 p. 377):
(2.1) Sense Determines Reference: (∆(s, d0) & ∆(s, d1)) =⇒ d0 = d1
Practically, this indicates to us that the presentation relationship is functional in character.
Thus instead of writing ∆(s, d), we may write instead ∆(s) = d. Likewise, borrowing
notation from computability theory, sometimes we write ∆(s) ↓ to indicate that there is
a d such that ∆(s) = d (cf. [87] pp. 16-17). Of course, we should keep in mind that on its
intended interpretation, the presentation relation is not a total function. For, any meaningful
linguistic expression will always have a sense but need not have a referent.
The other of Church’s axioms pertain to compositionality. On the side of reference,
Frege postulated a fundamental distinction between objects and concepts. Objects were
the referents of proper names of people and places, whereas concepts were the referents of
predicate-words. In sentences such as “Venus is a planet,” we predicate a concept (“being a
planet”) of an object (“Venus”). This may be rendered as a case of functional application,
namely Planet(Venus) = 1. Following contemporary practice, we here identify “1” with
the truth-value “true” and “0” with the truth-value “false,” and for the sake of simplicity
we assume that these are the only truth-values.
Due to the fact that sense is a determiner of reference, it’s natural to think that senses
of sentences are also compositional. Frege called the senses of sentences thoughts, so that
sentences express thoughts and refer to truth-values. Just as the reference of a sentence is
a function of the reference of its constituent parts, so Frege and Church hold that the sense
of a sentence (a thought or a proposition) is a function of the senses of its parts. This thus
suggested to Church the following axiom on the presentation relationship (Church’s Axiom
15 [15] p. 18, [52] pp. 108-109, [1] p. 219; cf. [2] Axiom C7 p. 377):
(2.2) Composition Axiom: [∆(f ′) = f & ∆(x′) = x] =⇒ ∆(f ′〈x′〉) = f(x)
Here (f ′, x′) 7→ f ′〈x′〉 is a primitive intensional application function on senses, just as (f, x) 7→
f(x) is a primitive extensional application function on referents. The axiom itself leaves open
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the relationship between intensional and extensional application, although we’ll see later in
this section, Church himself proposed that we identify them.
Now we have at least six types of entities: objects, senses of objects, concepts, senses
of concepts, truth-values, senses of truth-values (which we also call thoughts or proposi-
tions). However, there is a serious redundancy here. For, we may identify concepts with
functions from objects to truth-values. (For details on this familiar identification, see circa
equation (3.1) in the next section). If one does so, then it seems natural enough to further
assume that if a is a type of entity and b is a type of entity, then there is a type ab of
entities consisting of functions from entities of type a to entities of type b. One makes these
assumptions rigorous by defining the types recursively as follows:
(2.3) (Types in the Church System) (i) there is a type e of objects, (ii) there is a type t
of truth-values, (iii) if a, b are types, then there is a type ab of functions from type a
entities to type b entities, and (iv) if a is a type then a′ is a type of senses which
present entities of type a.
In this last clause, it’s important to emphasize that a 7→ a′ is a primitive operation on
types (cf. Kaplan [51] p. 721 and Klement [54] p. 173). Hence, a′ is the result of applying
an operation to the type a, and not simply another variable for types (and likewise a′′ is
the result of applying the prime operation to type a′). Sometimes in what follows, if we
write entities of type a as f, g, h, . . . (resp. x, y, z . . .), then we will adopt the convention of
writing entities of type a′ as f ′, g′, h′, . . . (resp. x′, y′, z′ . . .). However, under this convention,
entity f ′ of type a′ is not the result of applying any operation to the entity f of type a, but
rather just a conventional device which allows us to visually keep track of which entity has
which type.
Having set up the type system in this way, one sees immediately that there must be
not a single presentation relationship ∆, but rather a presentation relationship ∆a for each
type a, which relates senses of type a′ to entities of type a. Having made this distinction, one
thus reformulates the Axiom that Sense Determines Reference (2.1) and the Composition
Axiom (2.5) as follows:
(2.4) Typed Sense Determines Reference: (∆a(s, d0) & ∆a(s, d1))⇒ d0 = d1
(2.5) Typed Composition: [∆ab(f
′) = f & ∆a(x′) = x] =⇒ ∆b(f ′〈x′〉) = f(x)
In the latter, the intensional application function (f ′, x′) 7→ f ′〈x′〉 takes an sense f ′ of
type (ab)′ and a sense x′ of type a′ and returns a sense of type b′, just as the extensional
application function (f, x) 7→ f(x) takes a referent f of type ab and a referent x of type a and
returns a referent of type b. Hence, just as there are as many presentation relations as there
are types, so there are as many intensional and extensional application functions as there
are pairs of types. Later, when we deal more formally with these systems, we will introduce
symbols subscripted by types for the intensional and extensional application functions but
for the time being we simply allow context to determine the types (cf. circa equation (5.14)
in §5). Finally, let’s record our standing assumption in this paper that entities of type ab
are individuated extensionally:
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(2.6) Extensional Identity Criterion for Functional Entities : if f, g are entities of type ab
then f = g if and only if f(x) = g(x) for all entities x of type a.
But no analogous assumptions are made on the individuation of entities of type (ab)′ in this
paper.
In his own writings, Church adopted the following axiom on the types themselves:
(2.7) Axiom of Type Reduction: (ab)′ = a′b′
In other words, this axiom says that the type (ab)′ of senses of functions from type a entities
to type b entities is identical to the type a′b′ of functions from senses of type a entities
to senses of type b entities. It’s called a reduction axiom because it allows one to reduce
the senses of all higher-order entities to the senses of objects and truth-values (and senses
of senses of objects, senses of propositions, etc.). The primary formal advantage of doing
this is that it allows one to interpret intensional application as extensional application and
hence disburdens one from developing an alternative conception of intensional application.
Indeed, if senses of concepts are really extensional functions from senses of objects to senses
of truth-values, then it’s natural to think that the sense of a proposition is produced via the
extensional application of the sense of an object to the sense of a concept.
But some of the objections to Church’s intensional logic have revolved around this
Axiom of Type Reduction (2.7). Dummett was concerned that the reduction axiom would
require us to deny the seemingly plausible idea that “[. . . ] we are able to learn what thought
some sentences containing the predicate express in advance of knowing the sense of the
predicate” ([28] p. 294, cf. [52] pp. 69-70 ff). Dummett’s idea was that we can learn the
senses of complete propositions like Fa and Fb without precisely knowing the sense of F .
But the Axiom of Type Reduction (2.7) demands that the sense of F is a function, hence
presumably complete propositions like Fa and Fb will be the result of functional application
of this sense-function, so that knowledge of them may well require prior knowledge of the
sense of F .
Another objection to Church’s Axiom of Type Reduction (2.7) is due to Bealer, who
notes that functionality seems to be entirely absent from qualia and other facets of conscious
experience. Bealer writes: “Joy, the shape of my hand, the aroma of coffee- these are not
functions. When I feel joy, see the shape of my hand, or smell the aroma of coffee, it is not
a function that I feel, see, or smell (cf. [7] p. 90, cf. [32] p. 6). This concern resonates
well with the observation that when we are pressed to say something about the sense of
words such as “red,” “cold,” or “bitter,” the mathematical notion of a function is far from
our first thoughts. Of course, someone who denies Church’s reduction axiom for these types
of reasons need not be taken to deny that senses can compose with other senses. Rather,
the denial should be registered merely as a denial that senses of predicate words can be
exhaustively identified with functions from senses to other senses.
Once we reject Church’s reduction axiom, we are left with the following core of Church’s
system:
(2.8) The core of Church’s system consists of the Typed Sense Determines Reference (2.4)
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and the Typed Composition Axiom (2.5); this theory is a typed theory, and the types
are exactly as in (2.3).
It’s noteworthy that there is nothing in these core axioms themselves that forces or even
necessarily recommends the identification of type a′ with Fregean senses as opposed to any
other notion of meaning. Indeed, Kaplan pointed out long ago that the standard frameworks
for possible worlds semantics yield models of these axioms (cf. [51] pp. 721 ff). In particular,
Kaplan proceeded by identifying type a′ in the Church system with the type of functions
from the worlds to the entities of type a and by defining the other primitives of the Church
system as follows, wherein w0 is fixed world (say the actual world) and w is an arbitrary
world:
(2.9) ∆a(f
′) = f ′(w0), (f ′〈x′〉)(w) = (f ′(w))(x′(w))
On the basis of these definitions, it’s not too difficult to check that the Typed Sense Deter-
mines Reference (2.4) and the Typed Composition Axiom (2.5) are both satisfied.1 The core
of Church’s system is thus fairly neutral on the philosophical interpretation of the inten-
sional notions which it axiomatizes. In the next section we turn to the formalization of the
Russell-Myhill paradox within this core system, and this treatment of the paradox will yield
a common framework in which advocates of Fregean sense and advocates of possible worlds
semantics can discuss the comparative advantages and disadvantages of different solutions
to the paradox.
Before doing so, it’s perhaps worth underscoring some of the departures that we have
made in this paper from traditional treatments of Church’s intensional logic. Some of these
differences are merely notational. One such difference is that Church wrote the type reserved
for functions from entities of type a to entities of type b as ba rather than ab (cf. [15] p. 12,
[2] p. 370, [52] p. 106). We prefer the latter simply because it is now the norm in formal
semantics (cf. [45] p. 28, [42] pp. 84, 121). Further, Church respectively used the letters o1
and ι1 instead of t and e for the truth-values and objects (cf. [15] p. 11, [2] p. 370, [52] p.
106). Again, we use t and e simply because this is now the norm (cf. [45] p. 28, [42] pp.
79, 128). Finally, sometimes in Church –and sometimes in intensional logics more generally–
the word “concept,” perhaps proceeded by modifiers like “individual” or “propositional,” is
reserved for certain kinds of senses or intensions (cf. [52] p. 96, [32] pp. 155 ff, [42] p. 122).
However, here in this paper we eschew this usage and use the Fregean terminology, on which
“concepts” are the unsaturated entities which may be saturated by objects and which are
thus one-half of the concept-object distinction.
The chief contentful difference between Church’s original formulation of his intensional
logic and our treatment of it concerns intensional application. Church himself did not intro-
duce a primitive (f ′, x′) 7→ f ′〈x′〉 for intensional application; again, this was because of his
adoption of the axiom on type-reduction (2.7) which we and many others reject. Further,
1The Typed Sense Determines Reference (2.4) is satisfied because the definition of ∆a(f
′) in equation (2.9)
is clearly functional since f ′ is by stipulation a function defined on worlds and the world of evaluation w0
is fixed. For the Typed Composition Axiom (2.5), suppose that ∆ab(f
′) = f and ∆ax′ = x. Then one can
calculate that ∆b(f
′〈x′〉) = (f ′〈x′〉)(w0) = (f ′(w0))(x′(w0)) = (∆abf ′)(∆ax′) = f(x).
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because of his adoption of this axiom, Church did not introduce a primitive operation a 7→ a′
on types but could simply get by with postulating types o1, o2, . . . , ι1, ι2, . . . wherein the type
o1 is the type of truth-values and the type ι1 is the type of objects and wherein σn+1 is
the type reserved for senses of entities of type σn for σ ∈ {o, ι} (cf. [15] pp. 7, 11, [2]
p. 370, [52] p. 106). If one rejects the axiom on type-reduction (2.7), then it’s natural to
postulate the primitive operation a 7→ a′ on types, and here we follow Kaplan [51] p. 721
and Klement [54] p. 173. Finally, much of Church’s own work on his system concerned var-
ious proposals for individuating senses, and these went under the name of Alternative (0),
Alternative (1), and Alternative (2) (cf. Klement [52] pp. 101 ff for overview). How exactly
senses are individuated is obviously important, but it is not needed for the formalization
of the Russell-Myhill Paradox discussed in the next section or for the predicative response
discussed in the subsequent sections.2
3 Formalized Version of the Russell-Myhill Paradox
and Extant Responses
The aim of this section is to set out a formalized version of the Russell-Myhill Paradox and
to survey some extant non-predicative responses. The formalization offered here is distinct
from but owes much to the formalizations offered by Anderson and Klement, and we’ll discuss
explicitly in this section these similarities and differences. Since the Russell-Myhill paradox
is a proposition-theoretic version of the Russell paradox about sets, it’s useful to begin with a
brief review of Russell’s paradox about sets and Cantor’s related theorem about cardinalities.
A collection X is said to have cardinality less than or equal to collection Y just in case there
is an injection ι : X → Y , while the two collections X, Y are said to have the same cardinality
if there is a bijection between them. Cantor’s theorem about cardinalities says that for any
collection, there is no injection from the set of all its subcollections to itself. In symbols,
Cantor’s theorem says that for any X, there is no injection from {Y : Y ⊆ X} to X itself.
But there is a natural bijective correspondence between the subcollections Y ⊆ X and the
zero-one valued functions f : X → {0, 1}, given by sending Y ⊆ X to its characteristic
function fY : X → {0, 1} which is defined by
(3.1) fY (x) =
{
1 x ∈ Y ,
0 x /∈ Y .
Since the type at is reserved for functions from entities of type a to the truth-values {0, 1},
there is thus a natural type-theoretic expression of Cantor’s theorem:
2Admittedly, there is something deeper going on here. The distinction between Alternative (0) and
Alternative (1) lies in whether lambda-conversion preserves sense. However, lambda-terms are an alternative
way of formalizing comprehension (cf. (4.1)) which the predicative response offered here does not have
available in full generality. Thus the formal extensions of Church’s core system with which we work here
simply don’t have lambda-terms in the object-language. Hence an immediate issue which faced Church–
namely whether to say that lambda-conversion preserves sense– is not even available in the object-language
of our systems.
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(3.2) (Type-Theoretic Version of Cantor’s Theorem) For any type a, there is no injection
from entities of type at to entities of type a.
This version is entirely type-theoretic, since the injection in question would be an element of
type (at)a and since the property of being injective is expressible purely with the extensional
application notions built into the type theory.
Let us briefly recall the traditional proof of the type-theoretic version of Cantor’s Theo-
rem. For the sake of readability, in this proof let us write entities of type at as f, g, h . . . and
entities of type a as x, y, z . . .. A function from the entities of type at to entities of type a
is a function ι taking input f of type at and returning output ι(f) = x of type a. Now,
suppose that there was such an injection ι from entities of type at to entities of type a. Then
consider the diagonal map d from elements of type a to elements of type t given by
(3.3) d(x) = 1⇐⇒ ∃ f (ι(f) = x & f(x) = 0)
Then let y = ι(d) and ask whether d(y) = 1 or d(y) = 0. If d(y) = 1, then by the left-to-right
direction of equation (3.3) one obtains witness f satisfying ι(f) = y and f(y) = 0. Then
since ι(d) = y = ι(f), we may conclude from the injectivity of ι that d = f , which contradicts
that d(y) = 1 while f(y) = 0. Alternatively, if d(y) = 0, then d and y are witness to the
right-hand side of equation (3.3), and so by the right-to-left direction of this equation we
have d(y) = 1, a contradiction. Hence, in either case we obtain a contradiction.
The connection between the type-theoretic version of Cantor’s theorem and Russell’s
paradox about sets can be made more transparent if one defines a membership relation by
(3.4) y ∈ x⇐⇒ ∃ f (ι(f) = x & f(y) = 1)
Further, for the moment let’s call a set an entity which is in the range of the operator ι.
Then for any set x, it follows from the injectivity of the ι-operator that we can also express
non-membership in x with an existential quantifier as follows:
(3.5) y /∈ x⇐⇒ ∃ f (ι(f) = x & f(y) = 0)
But then it is easy to see that for sets x, equation (3.3) is equivalent to:
(3.6) d(x) = 1⇐⇒ x /∈ x
Expressed in these terms, the diagonal function d from the above paragraph is the charac-
teristic function of the collection of sets which are not members of themselves. This is one
way to see the connection between the Russell paradox about sets and the type-theoretic
version of Cantor’s Theorem.
The Russell-Myhill paradox about propositions proceeds by arguing, based on consid-
erations related directly to propositions, that there is an injection from collections of propo-
sitions to propositions. Since type t′ is reserved for propositions in the Church system and
since collections of propositions can be identified with their characteristic functions of type t′t
(a` la equation (3.1)), if this argument were correct than it would mean that there was an
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injection from entities of type t′t to entities of type t′, which contradicts the type-theoretic
version of Cantor’s Theorem (3.2). One way to respond to the Russell-Myhill paradox about
propositions is to block in a well-motivated way the type-theoretic version of Cantor’s The-
orem (3.2). This is the kind of proposal which we shall pursue in this paper, beginning in
§4. But in the remainder of this section we focus simply on formalizing the Russell-Myhill
paradox and on surveying other extant responses.
The informal version of the Russell-Myhill paradox was initially described in Appendix B
of Russell’s 1903 The Principles of Mathematics and then again in Myhill’s 1958 paper on
Church’s intensional logic.3 The argument of Russell and Myhill runs as follows. Given a
collection of propositions C, consider the proposition ι(C) expressed by the sentence “every
proposition in C is true” (or “every proposition is in C.”) It seems that this function is an
injection. For, suppose that ι(C) = ι(D). Since these two propositions differ only as to C
and D, then presumably the senses (or intensions) of their constituents C and D are the
same as well. And this would presumably imply that C and D are the same not only in sense
or intension, but that they are also the same in reference or extension. Hence the map ι is
ostensibly an injection from collections of propositions to propositions. But, by applying the
type-theoretic version of Cantor’s Theorem (3.2), we obtain a contradiction.
While this version of the Russell-Myhill paradox is traditional, it is not obviously a
formal paradox. This is for two reasons. First, formal paradoxes show that some formal
system is inconsistent. But it is not at all obvious– based merely on its informal description–
in what system the argumentation of the above paragraph may be formalized. To be sure,
a good start could be made on this to the extent that one could formalize the notion of “a
sentence expressing a proposition.” But to the extent that one could formalize this notion
one could presumably likewise formalize the notion of “a sentence denoting a truth-value,”
and hence one would worry that this formalization would require prior treatment of the liar
paradox.4 Second, formal paradoxes are always valid arguments, whose conclusion is that
some formal set of axioms is inconsistent. But there is a real concern about the validity
of the above rendition of the Russell-Myhill paradox. For, it seems at crucial points to
equivocate between the collection C and a sense thereof. Indeed, it seems that it is the latter
3More specifically see §500 p. 538 of Russell [78] and p. 82 of Myhill [63]. According to the history
as set out in de Rouilhan [19], Russell never mentioned this paradox again. As for Myhill, in the same
1958 paper he reports that Carnap’s “general approach to the problem, in terms of ‘possible worlds’ and
state-descriptions, is in [his] opinion practically certain to yield a correct explication within a few years”
([63] p. 81). This contrasts with Myhill’s earlier 1952 paper on Church ([62]) in which he weighs carefully
the costs and benefits of Fregean and modal approaches without indicating a decisive preference for either.
It is well-known that Myhill continued to work on intuitionistic and non-classical approaches to the set-
theoretic paradoxes throughout his career, but to my knowledge he never after the 1958 paper returned to
this proposition-theoretic paradox.
4Intensional logics like Church’s intensional logic and possible worlds semantics have resources for axiom-
atizing the notion of a “proposition denoting the true.” In Church’s system, this is written as ∆t(p) = 1
while in possible worlds semantics this is written p(w0) = 1 where w0 is the world of evaluation. However,
in neither of these intensional logics does one have the resources for going from a name of a sentence to the
proposition expressed by the sentence. If one did, then since these systems of intensional logic are consistent
with the addition of resources needed to effect self-reference, one could replicate the formal versions of the
liar paradox.
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which would contribute to the proposition expressed by “every proposition in C is true.”
Yet, the argument as a whole pertains to an injection which takes as inputs collections
of propositions C. A truly formalized version of the Russell-Myhill paradox would leave
no doubt as to whether the argument was, at any juncture, operating on a collection of
propositions or a sense.5
The formalization of the Russell-Myhill paradox which we adopt avoids these two prob-
lems, and reads as follows:
(3.7) (Formalized Russell-Myhill Paradox ). The following axioms are jointly inconsistent
against the background of the core of Church’s system (2.8): the Surjectivity Ax-
iom (3.8), the Senses are Objects Axiom (3.9), the Propositions as Fine-Grained as
Objects Axiom (3.10), and the type-theoretic version of Cantor’s Theorem (3.2).
As one can see, this formalization concerns three additional axioms which we need to intro-
duce and motivate in these next pages prior to setting out the derivation of the paradox.
The first axiom in the formalized version of the paradox is the called the Surjectivity
Axiom. In essence, this axiom says that every entity– including the higher-order ones– are
presented by some sense or intension:
(3.8) Surjectivity Axiom: for each type a and each element f of type a, there is element f ′
of type a′ such that ∆a(f ′) = f .
The immediate warrant for this axiom is that there is simply no other way to formalize the
Russell-Myhill paradox. For, consider again how it opens: “for each collection of proposi-
tions C, consider the proposition ι(C) expressed by the sentence ‘every proposition in C is
true.’ ” We accordingly need some way to move from any collection of propositions to a
proposition. It seems that any way in which we do this will take a collection of propositions,
take a sense or intension which presents this collection, and build a proposition based off of
this sense.6
The next axiom concerns the location of senses or intensions within Frege’s concept-
object distinction, or within the typed systems usually employed in formal semantics. In
essence, it says that senses or intensions fall on the object side of the concept-object distinc-
tion:
(3.9) Senses are Objects Axiom: for each type a and each element f ′ of type a′, there is
element x of type e such that f ′ = x.
5Klement suggests that this kind of concern is one way of understanding Frege’s own reservations about
the Russell-Myhill paradox ([52] p. 183).
6The Surjectivity Axiom has a long and complicated history in Church’s own writings. In 1946, Church
seemed to indicate that Cantor-like paradoxes would lead one to deny this axiom ([14] p. 31). In 1974,
Church indicated that this axiom followed from the premises of his system called Alternative 2 ([16] p. 145).
In his last paper in 1993, Church included this axiom in his system ([18] pp. 144-145), albeit without saying
anything explicit about his reasons for this inclusion. For other statements of the Surjectivity Axiom in the
secondary literature, see Anderson [1] principle (C) p. 221 and Klement [52] Theorem LSD(0) 1 p. 116 and
Klement [53] p. 305 Axiom PC. For more on Anderson and Klement on the Surjectivity Axiom, see the
discussion below.
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This axiom is non-trivial because f ′ and x are variables of different types. If contrary to fact
they were variables of the same type, this would simply be a truth of the ambient predicate
logic. The primary kind of consideration which points in favor of the Senses are Objects
Axiom is a reflection on traditional conceptions of the nature of Fregean senses: in particular,
while Russell suggested that we might view Fregean senses as definite descriptions,7 Dummett
has suggested that we might understand them as certain kinds of procedures or algorithms, a
“route to reference.”8 If either of these two traditional proposals about the nature of Fregean
sense are correct, then it seems that senses might be regarded as objects of certain kinds, as
opposed to concepts: for, whatever the exact nature of definite descriptions and algorithms,
presumably they are unsaturated and fall on the “object” side of Frege’s concept-object
distinction. For instance, if one views definite descriptions as Go¨del numbers of formulas or
if one views algorithms as indexes of Turing machines this will be the case.9
The final axiom operative in our formalized version of the Russell-Myhill paradox (3.10)
is an axiom postulating a connection between objects and propositions:
(3.10) Propositions as Fine-Grained as Objects Axiom: there is an injection χ from entities
of type e to entities of type t′.
Since entities of type e are objects and entities of type t′ are propositions, this axiom is
just saying that there is an injection from objects to propositions. One plausible case for
this axiom might be made from the assumption that (i) our language is ample enough to
distinguish different objects from one another and (ii) propositions are organized roughly
after the manner of the sentences which express them. For, by (i), for any object, we can
fasten onto a predicate or name in our language which distinguishes this object from the
others in our purview. And then by (ii) the distinctness of this item of language, be it a
predicate or name, will then be matched in the propositions expressed by sentences featuring
it.
7It is admittedly somewhat inaccurate to speak of definite descriptions merely as an “interpretation
of Fregean sense,” since they in fact provide a systematic way of dispensing with the Fregean notion of
expression altogether and maintaining that reference is the sole semantic primitive. But presumably part of
our tradition’s reason for thinking that Frege’s theory of meaning is susceptible to modal counterexamples
couched in terms of definite descriptions is something like the thought that we can think of Fregean senses
as definite descriptions.
8Cf. [28] pp. 96, 102, 179 ff, [47] pp. 66 ff, [88] p. 323. This idea is also associated to Tichy´. See in
particular the papers “Sense and Procedure” and “Intensions in Terms of Turing Machines” in [91].
9Obviously, one way to respond to the version of the Russell-Myhill paradox formalized here would be to
deny the Senses are Objects Axiom (3.9). One way to do that might be to accept that senses are definite
descriptions or procedures but to deny that these can be identified with specific objects like Go¨del numbers
of formulas or indexes of Turing machines. Traditional reasons for such a denial might be that e.g. abstract
procedures aren’t represented by a specific index for a specific Turing machine, but rather by a large class of
such indexes (cf. [8]). I don’t think that such a response would ultimately succeed. For, grant all this and
then just select, for each abstract procedure, a specific index for a specific Turing machine which represents
it, and call these things quasi-senses. Then quasi-senses are objects and so one could run the entire Russell-
Myhill paradox again with respect to quasi-senses. For, the other axioms occurring in the formalized version
of the paradox seem just as plausible for the so-defined quasi-senses as for senses qua abstract procedures. A
similar point can be made with respect to definite descriptions simply by selecting Go¨del numbers of specific
formulas.
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Having set out and motivated the various axioms, let us now establish the formalized
version of the Russell-Myhill paradox (3.7). By the Surjectivity Axiom (3.8), for every
collection of propositions C, there is a sense C ′ which presents it. By the Senses are Objects
Axiom (3.9), each such sense C ′ is identical to some object. There is thus a map from
collections of propositions to objects such that the object is identical to a sense which presents
the collection. More formally:
(3.11) For every collection of propositions C there is an object x and there is a sense C ′ such
that C ′ is identical to object x and C ′ presents C.
This induces a map C 7→ δ(C) from collections of propositions to objects such that
(3.12) For every collection of propositions C there is a sense C ′ such that C ′ is identical to
object δ(C) and C ′ presents C.
Further, by the Propositions as Fine-Grained as Objects Axiom (3.10), there is an injection χ
from objects to propositions. Let ι be the composition of the two maps, so that ι = χ ◦ δ.
Then ι is a map from collections of propositions C to propositions ι(C). Further, the map ι too
is an injection. For, suppose that ι(C1) = ι(C2). Then since χ is an injection, δ(C1) = δ(C2).
Then by the characterization of δ in equation (3.12), for each k ∈ {1, 2} there is sense C ′k =
δ(Ck) which presents Ck. But since δ(C1) = δ(C2), we have that C ′1 = C ′2. Since C ′k presents Ck,
by the Typed Sense Determines Reference Axiom (2.4), it follows that C1 = C2. Hence the
map ι is an injection from collections of propositions to propositions, which contradicts the
type-theoretic version of Cantor’s Theorem (3.2).
This formalization of the Russell-Myhill paradox is distinct from but owes much to
the earlier formalizations of Anderson and Klement. On the one hand, Anderson made the
Surjectivity Axiom (3.8) the focus of his treatments of the paradox ([1] pp. 221 ff, [4] pp.
107 ff). However, Anderson’s formalization is given in a system which includes the axiom
of type-reduction (2.7), and so is not obviously available once we have rejected this axiom.
In his paper [53], Klement gave a version of the Russell-Myhill paradox which invoked a
“principle of conceivability” to the effect that “for every entity, there is at least one sense
presenting it as referent” ([53] p. 305, cf. §5 pp. 309 ff). Our Surjectivity Axiom (3.8)
is just another expression of Klement’s principle of conceivability. However, in that paper,
Klement worked in a system which collapsed the concept-object distinction, so that concepts
were a particular species of object.10 Since we want to work within Church’s intensional logic,
which is a typed system, our formalization has to proceed slightly differently. That said, one
can view the formalization given above as the minimal way to modify the formalization of
Klement [53] into the framework of what we’re calling the core of Church’s system (2.8). In
particular, while Klement’s argument postulated that concepts were a particular species of
object, the Senses are Objects Axiom (3.9) postulates that senses are a particular species of
object.11
10See axiom “PCE” on [53] p. 305. Another way of formalizing the system of Klement [53] might be to
regard it simply as an untyped system, where there is no distinction between concepts and objects.
11It also bears mentioning that Church, Anderson, and Klement additionally considered formalizations of
the Russell-Myhill paradox within an alternative framework of intensional logic that goes under the heading
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Let’s now turn to describing extant responses to this formalized version of the Russell-
Myhill paradox. Of course, the specific formalization given above is new to this paper; hence,
it is not as if previous authors have explicitly addressed this specific rendition of the paradox.
However, anyone who has constructed a model of the core of Church’s system (2.8) has found
some way to avoid this paradox, and so we can ask how these consistent formal systems evade
the formalized version of the Russell-Myhill paradox. By Kaplan’s construction described in
the last section (circa equation (2.9)), we can view the standard models of possible worlds
semantics as models of Church’s core system, and it turns out that the Surjectivity Axiom
always comes out true on these models. For, on these models, intensions are just functions
from possible worlds to extensions, and so for any extension one can consider the “constant”
intension that picks out that extension at any world. The models traditionally used in
possible worlds semantics are so-called “standard” models in which the type ab is interpreted
as the set of all functions from entities of type a to entities of type b, as judged by the ambient
set-theoretic metatheory; hence, the type-theoretic version of Cantor’s Theorem (3.2) also
comes out true on these models. The tradition of possible worlds semantics then avoids
the formalized version of the Russell-Myhill paradox by either rejecting the Propositions
as Fine-Grained as Objects Axiom (3.10) or the Senses are Objects Axiom (3.9). For, if
there are fewer sets of worlds than there are objects in the worlds, then of course there
is no injection from objects to propositions, and so the Propositions as Fine-Grained as
Objects Axiom (3.10) comes out false. But if there are more sets of worlds than there are
objects in the worlds, then there will be properly more functions from worlds to collections of
propositions than there are objects, and hence in this case the Senses are Objects Axiom (3.9)
comes out false.12
The work of Anderson (cf. [1], [2] pp. 371 ff) represents a distinct response to
the Russell-Myhill paradox, on which one rethinks certain elements of Church’s Core Sys-
tem (2.8). Anderson’s basic idea was to modify Church’s system so that there was not a
of “Russellian intensional logic” ([17], [3], [52] pp. 175 ff). This is the general framework which Klement
employed in his widely-read [55]. Since this framework was designed to be an alternative to what we’re
calling “Church’s intensional logic,” we have not made use of this in our formalization. By the same token,
it is beyond the scope of this paper to say whether anything like a predicative response is available in
this alternative framework. To say anything definitive would require at least another lengthy consistency
proof like that we offer in §5. If it turned out that nothing like a predicative response was available in this
alternative setting, this might well indicate a certain lack of robustness to the predicative response offered
in this paper.
12More formally, we suppose that the types are assigned to sets as follows, wherein E and W are fixed
sets, corresponding to the objects and the worlds respectively (cf. (5.1)):
(3.7) De = E, Dt = {0, 1}, Dab = DDab = {f : Da → Db}, Da′ = DWa = {f : W → Da}
Suppose that we are working in a set-theoretic metatheory where as usual |X| is used to denote the cardinality
of the set X. Then either |Dt′ | < |De| or not. If so, then there is no injection from De to Dt′ and the
Propositions as Fine-Grained as Objects Axiom (3.10) comes out false. Suppose alternatively that |Dt′ | ≥
|De|. Since we’re working in a set-theoretic metatheory, we can then appeal to Cantor’s theorem and basic
facts about cardinality to obtain that
∣∣D(t′t)′ ∣∣ ≥ |Dt′t| > |Dt′ | ≥ |De|. Then it is not the case that D(t′t)′
(or anything bijective with it) is a subset of De and hence the Senses are Objects Axiom (3.9) comes out
false for the specific type of a = (t′t).
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single presentation relation ∆, but rather a series of presentation relations ∆(1),∆(2), . . ..
Let’s call ∆(n) the n-th order presentation function. On this view, one modifies the axioms
of Church’s Core System (2.8) so that there is one of these axioms for each of the n-th
order presentation functions. If one wants to present a formalization of the Russell-Myhill
paradox, one needs to specialize it to some specific n-th order presentation function. On this
conception, it’s natural to think that the analogues of the Surjectivity Axiom would be false.
While it might be true in certain models that every higher-order entity was n-th order pre-
sented for some n, there might not be a single n which did this for each higher-order entity.
Anderson’s response to the Russell-Myhill paradox then parallels the “typed” responses to
the liar paradox (cf. [2] p. 376).
This is not the place to argue against the various responses to the formalized version
of the Russell-Myhill paradox which we have distilled from the writings of Kaplan and
Anderson. For one, it seems likely that such an adjudication would ultimately proceed by
reference to larger considerations like the ability of each of the resulting systems to interpret
categorical grammar or to provide a satisfactory semantics for belief attributions. Further,
before trying to resolve the paradox in favor of one of these responses, it’s important to
understand whether we have actually exhausted the entirety of the solution space to the
paradox. It seems that the predicativity response has been neglected in the extant literature
on the Russell-Myhill paradox, and a chief aim of this paper, which we begin on in earnest
in the next section, is to describe the general shape of a plausible predicative response to
the Russell-Myhill paradox of propositions.13
4 The Predicative Response to Russell-Myhill
In the last pages we have surveyed how various constructions of models of Church’s core
system (2.8) avoid the formalized version of the Russell-Myhill paradox (3.7). In the extant
literature there seems to have been no attempt to respond to this paradox by rejecting the
type-theoretic version of Cantor’s Theorem (3.2). Part of the reason for this might be that
Cantor’s theorem is, well, a theorem. So there might be great pressure to not reject it.
But this pressure will only be so great as the strength and plausibility of the axioms from
which the theorem is derived. The axioms tacit in the derivation given above of Cantor’s
theorem are instances of the so-called comprehension schema. However, there is a long
tradition of predicative mathematics, stemming from Poincare´ and Weyl and represented in
our day by the likes of Feferman ([33, 35]), which proceeds by systematically restricting
the comprehension schema. Our aim in what follows is simply to set out and examine a
predicative response to the Russell-Myhill paradox of propositions.
Intuitively, the comprehension schema is a mechanism for converting formulas to higher-
order entities. In the setting of type-theory, it’s most expedient to adopt a version which
says that any functional formula determines a higher-order function:
13Obviously other approaches have been neglected as well: for instance, I know of no extant approaches
to the Russell-Myhill paradox which adopt the perspective of non-classical logic.
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(4.1) (Typed Comprehension Schema). The typed comprehension schema consists of all the
axioms
∀ z1, . . . , zk [[∀ x ∃! y ϕ(x, y, z1, . . . , zk)]→ ∃ h [∀ x ϕ(x, h(x), z1, . . . , zk)]]
where ϕ(x, y, z1, . . . , zk) is a formula with all free variables displayed and with free
variable x of type a, y of type b, while h is a variable of type ab that does not appear
free in ϕ.
In this schema, “∃!x θ(x)” is simply the standard abbreviation expressive of uniqueness:
“∃ x (θ(x) & ∀ z (θ(z)→ z = x))”. A special case of this is the following, in which there is
no requirement that the formula in question be functional in nature:
(4.2) (Concept Comprehension Schema). The concept comprehension schema consists of all
the axioms ∀ z1, . . . , zk ∃ h ∀ x (h(x) = 1 ↔ ψ(x, z1, . . . , zk)), where ψ(x, z1, . . . , zk)
is a formula with all free variables displayed and with free variable x of type a, while h
is a variable of type at which does not appear free in ψ.
To derive this schema from the Typed Comprehension Schema (4.1), one defines the for-
mula ϕ(x, y, z1, . . . , zk) to be
(4.3) [(ψ(x, z1, . . . , zk) ∧ y = 1) ∨ (¬ψ(x, z1, . . . , zk) ∧ y = 0)]
The reason for wanting the Typed Comprehension Schema as opposed to the mere Concept
Comprehension Schema (4.2) is that one wants a way to e.g. go from the entity q of type a to
the constant function fq(x) = q of type aa. Since the Concept Comprehension Schema (4.2)
only delivers entities h of type at, it itself cannot do this. Finally, there is a natural principle
which generalizes rather than specializes the Typed Comprehension Schema. In particular,
if one removes the uniqueness clause from the antecedent of this schema, then this becomes
a version of the axiom of choice:
(4.4) (Typed Choice Schema). The typed choice schema consists of all the axioms
∀ z1, . . . , zk [[∀ x ∃ y ϕ(x, y, z1, . . . , zk)]→ ∃ h [∀ x ϕ(x, h(x), z1, . . . , zk)]]
where ϕ(x, y, z1, . . . , zk) is a formula with all free variables displayed and with free
variable x of type a, y of type b, while h is a variable of type ab which does not appear
free in ϕ.
The Typed Choice Schema (4.4) trivially implies the Typed Comprehension Schema (4.1),
which as we remarked above implies the Concept Comprehension Schema (4.2).
The predicative response to the Russell-Myhill paradox restricts the Typed Compre-
hension Schema (4.1) by imposing constraints on the kinds of higher-order quantifiers and
higher-order parameters that can occur in the formula. These restrictions are formulated in
terms of the notion of the degree of a type:
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(4.5) (Degree of Type) The degree of a type is a positive natural number which is defined
recursively as follows:
‖e‖ = ‖t‖ = 1, ‖a′‖ = ‖a‖, ‖ab‖ =
{
‖a‖+ 1 if ‖a‖ ≥ ‖b‖,
‖b‖ if ‖a‖ < ‖b‖.
To illustrate this last clause, note that ‖e(et)‖ = ‖t(et)‖ = 2 and ‖(et)e‖ = ‖(et)t‖ = 3,
while ‖a‖ < ‖ab‖ and ‖b‖ ≤ ‖ab‖ for all types a, b. Intuitively, the idea is that degree goes
up when the entities of type ab are genuinely of higher order than those entities of type b.
For instance, suppose that a = t so that that there are only two entities of type a, namely the
two truth-values 0 and 1, and suppose that b = et, so that there are many entities of type b,
namely as many as there are concepts. Then entities of type ab are functions from {0, 1}
to concepts, and so are really just another way of talking about pairs of concepts. Hence,
quantifying over entities of type ab should involve no more higher-order quantification than
quantifying over concepts, and so the degree of ab should be the same as the degree of b in
this case.
The predicative comprehension schema may then be defined as follows:
(4.6) (Predicative Typed Comprehension Schema). The predicative typed comprehension
schema consists of all the axioms
∀ z1, . . . , zk [[∀ x ∃! y ϕ(x, y, z1, . . . , zk)]→ ∃ h [∀ x ϕ(x, h(x), z1, . . . , zk)]]
where ϕ(x, y, z1, . . . , zk) is a formula with all free variables displayed and with free
variable x of type a, y of type b, while h is a variable of type ab which does not appear
free in ϕ, and in addition variable zi has type ci with ‖ci‖ ≤ ‖ab‖ and all the bound
variables in ϕ(x, y, z1, . . . , zk) have type c with ‖c‖ < ‖ab‖.
Using the same trick as above in equation (4.3), it’s easy to see that the Predicative Typed
Comprehension Schema (4.6) implies a version of the Concept Comprehension Schema in
which there are the same restrictions on the parameters and bound variables appearing in
the formula. For the sake of completeness, we state this version here:
(4.7) (Predicative Concept Comprehension Schema). The predicative concept comprehen-
sion schema consists of all the axioms
∀ z1, . . . , zk ∃ h ∀ x (h(x) = 1↔ ψ(x, z1, . . . , zk))
where ψ(x, z1, . . . , zk) is a formula with all free variables displayed and with free
variable x of type a, while h is a variable of type at which does not appear free in ψ,
and in addition variable zi has type ci with ‖ci‖ ≤ ‖a‖+1 and all the bound variables
in ψ(x, z1, . . . , zk) have type c with ‖c‖ < ‖a‖+ 1.
Finally, one has the predicative version of the Typed Choice Schema (4.4):
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(4.8) (Predicative Typed Choice Schema). The predicative typed choice schema consists of
all the axioms
∀ z1, . . . , zk [[∀ x ∃ y ϕ(x, y, z1, . . . , zk)]→ ∃ h [∀ x ϕ(x, h(x), z1, . . . , zk)]]
where ϕ(x, y, z1, . . . , zk) is a formula with all free variables displayed and with free
variable x of type a, y of type b, while h is a variable of type ab which does not appear
free in ϕ, and in addition variable zi has type ci with ‖ci‖ ≤ ‖ab‖ and all the bound
variables in ϕ(x, y, z1, . . . , zk) have type c with ‖c‖ < ‖ab‖.
Again, it’s easy to see that the Predicative Typed Choice Schema (4.8) is the deductively
strongest schema, so that it implies the Predicative Typed Comprehension Schema (4.6),
which in turn implies the Predicative Concept Comprehension Schema (4.7).
Let’s illustrate these predicative schemata by reference to the derivation of the type-
theoretic version of the Cantor’s Theorem (3.2). In particular, recall the following equation
where we defined the diagonal function d of type at:
(3.3) d(x) = 1⇐⇒ ∃ f (ι(f) = x & f(x) = 0)
This is a non-predicative instance of the concept comprehension schema. For, while the
defining formula of d has free variable x of type a with degree ‖a‖, this formula at the same
time contains a bound variable f of type at. But by consulting the definition of the degree of
a type (4.5), we see that ‖at‖ ≥ ‖a‖+ 1, so that the defining equation (3.3) of the diagonal
function d is not an instance of the Predicative Concept Comprehension Schema (4.7), even
though it is an instance of the more general Concept Comprehension Schema (4.2). Hence,
this illustrates how if one accepts only the Predicative Typed Comprehension Schema (4.6),
the traditional proof of the type-theoretic version of Cantor’s Theorem (3.2) is blocked.
A similar elementary observation can be used to illustrate the motivation for the con-
straints on the parameters in the predicative variants of the comprehension schemas. In
particular, if we did not have these restrictions, then we could again show that the diagonal
function d from (3.3) was in fact a higher-order entity. In this paragraph let us fix a type a
and let us reserve α and subscripted versions thereof for entities of type aa. Then consider
the admittedly uninteresting-appearing formula θ(x, y, z) ≡ y = z, wherein x, y, z are of
type a. Let q be an entity of type a. Then trivially we have ∀ x ∃ ! y θ(x, y, q). Then
by the Predicative Typed Comprehension Schema (4.6), there is a function αq of type aa
such that αq(x) = q for all x of type a. Let Θ(q, α) ≡ ∀ x α(x) = q, where again x has
type a and α has type aa. Then by the arguments given so far in this paragraph, we have
that ∀ q ∃ ! α Θ(q, α). Hence again by the Predicative Typed Comprehension Schema (4.6),
there is a function C of type a(aa) (wherein C reminds us of the word “constant”) such that
for all q of type a, we have C(q) = αq. Now, again by the Predicative Concept Comprehension
Schema (4.7), consider the following “higher-order diagonal” D function of type (aa)t:
(4.9) D(α) = 1⇐⇒ [∃ q α = C(q) & ∃ f (ι(f) = α(q) & f(α(q)) = 0)]
Intuitively, D is picking out those constant functions αq such that d(q) = 1 (where d is the
diagonal function from equation (3.3)). Now, D has type (aa)t with degree ‖(aa)t‖ > ‖a‖+1.
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If, contrary to fact, there were no restrictions on parameters in the Predicative Concept
Comprehension Schema (4.7), then we could use D, C to define a higher-order entity d˜ of
type at as follows:
(4.10) d˜(q˜) = 1⇐⇒ D(C(q˜)) = 1
Then one can verify that
(4.11) d˜(q˜) = 1⇐⇒ ∃ f (ι(f) = q˜ & f(q˜) = 0)
from which it follows that we have shown that the diagonal function d (3.3) again exists as
a higher-order entity. This is why it is necessary to include restrictions on parameters in the
predicative versions of the comprehension schema.
The predicativity response to the Russell-Myhill paradox has two great burdens. First,
it is necessary to show that the Predicative Typed Comprehension Schema (4.6) is consistent
with the remaining axioms from the formalized version of the Russell-Myhill paradox (3.7).
In the next section, we discharge this burden by proving:
(4.12) (Predicative Consistency Theorem). The following formal system is consistent: the
core of Church’s system (2.8), the Surjectivity Axiom (3.8), the Senses are Objects
Axiom (3.9), the Propositions as Fine-Grained as Objects Axiom (3.10), and the
Predicative Typed Choice Schema (4.8).
The second burden of the predicativity response is to say something about what motivates
the restriction on the Typed Comprehension Schema (4.1). Again, intuitively this schema
says that every functional formula determines a higher-order entity. If one restricts this, one
must say something about when and why a functional formula determines a higher-order
entity. In the remainder of this section, we discuss this more philosophical dimension of the
predicativity response to the Russell-Myhill paradox.
Poincare´ and Weyl were the original predicativists. They drew attention to the fact
that higher-order definitions are not in general preserved when one keeps the first-order
domain fixed but expands the range of the higher-order quantifiers. So Poincare´ identifies
predicativity with definitions that are preserved under such expansions: “a classification is
called predicative when it is not changed through the introduction of new elements” ([46] p.
233, [70] p. 47, cf. [12] p. 141). Likewise, in his 1918 Das Kontinuum, Weyl draws attention
to the fact that if one codes real numbers and continuous functions as certain sets of natural
numbers (or rationals), then the definition of the class of continuous functions will contain
higher-order quantifiers and thus what counts as a continuous function will depend crucially
on the extent and range of the higher-order quantifiers:
If we regard the principles of definition as an “open” system, i.e., if we reserve
the right to extend them when necessary by making additions, then in general
the question of whether a given function is continuous must also remain open
[. . . ]’ ([97] p. 66).
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The dual to Weyl’s remark is that if one wants to define notions whose extension does
not vary with the extent and range of the higher-order quantifiers, then one should restrict
attention to definitions which do not contain higher-order quantifiers.
In my view the best motivation for the predicativity restriction is related to these origi-
nal thoughts of Poincare´ and Weyl.14 In more modern terms, these ideas might be expressed
in terms of intuitions about the stability of reference. Suppose that one is using a definite
description to refer to an object. If minor variations in empirical conditions cause the object
to fail to satisfy this description, then the definite description will be a less than efficacious
route to reference. There is a natural generalization of this line of thought to the compre-
hension schema, where for the sake of simplicity we focus on the Concept Comprehension
Schema (4.2). The idea is that there is a natural way of seeing each instance of this schema as
related to a definite description of a higher-order entity. In particular, consider the following
instance of the Concept Comprehension Schema (4.2):
(4.13) ∃ h ∀ x (ϕ(x)↔ h(x) = 1)
One can think about this h as “the ϕ˜,” where we define:
(4.14) ϕ˜(h) ≡ [∀ x (ϕ(x)↔ h(x) = 1)]
If the formula ϕ(x) contains higher-order quantifiers, then whether a given h satisfies the
description ϕ˜(h) may vary with expansions of the range of the higher-order quantifiers.
However, when the formula does not itself contain higher-order quantifiers, then whether
something satisfies this description will be stable under expansions of the range of the higher-
order quantifiers.
The motivation for the Predicative Typed Comprehension Schema (4.6) can then be
seen to derive from the intuition that where one uses a definite description to effect reference
to a higher-order entity, this description should be stable under variations of the range of
the higher-order quantifiers. There is nonetheless still a residual philosophical challenge for
this predicative response. In particular, it must say something about what the pre-theoretic
idea is behind the relevant sense of expansion of the range of the higher-order quantifiers.
In my view, the best answer to this is tied to the kinds of positive reasons we can give for
the Surjectivity Axiom (3.8). The best positive reason to believe this axiom flows from a
conception of what we’re trying to model: we’re not trying to model higher-order entities as
they are in some abstract inaccessible third realm, but we’re trying to model higher-order
entities insofar as they fall within our referential ken. And it’s natural to think that our
14A distinct set of motivations for predicativity constraints come from the apparent affinity of predicativity
with types of constructivism. For more on this complicated aspect of the history of predicativity, see
Parsons [66]. Another important study of the history of predicativity-like conceptions is Goldfarb’s [43]
study of Russell. Goldfarb suggests that Russell’s reasons for endorsing predicativity-like constraints might
be related to having systems in which one can quantify over intensional entities like propositions. By
contrast, the motivations given here for predicativity constraints are not intended to have anything to do
with constructivity and are intended to apply with equal force to the quantifiers ranging over intensional
entities like propositions as to those ranging over extensional entities like concepts.
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resources for referring to higher-order entities expands over time just as our resources for
referring to concrete objects expands over time.15
However, it seems safe to say that the same motivations in terms of stability of reference
cannot be given for the more general Predicative Typed Choice Schema (4.8). Like the Pred-
icative Typed Comprehension Schema (4.6), instances of this schema are conditionals which
articulate a sufficient condition for the existence of a higher-order entity. However, unlike the
Predicative Typed Comprehension Schema (4.6), it does not seem that the sufficient condi-
tion offered by the Predicative Typed Choice Schema (4.8) can be conceived of as providing
any sort of intension which may serve as a mechanism by which to effect reference to the
higher-order entity in question. Thus the Predicative Typed Choice Schema (4.8) should not
be viewed as following from the predicative viewpoint articulated here, but rather should be
viewed as a tool which one can consistently avail oneself of.
This is important to be clear about because it’s only in the presence of some choice-
like principle that the Formalized Version of the Russell-Myhill Paradox (3.7) is actually a
deductively valid argument. In particular, in the derivation of the inconsistency in §3, it’s
easy to see that the move from equation (3.11) to equation (3.12) is an instance of some
choice-like principle, and one can verify that this move will be covered by the Predicative
Typed Choice Schema (4.8) (and hence the Typed Choice Schema (4.4)). If one wanted to
be very formal, another axiom that should be officially added to the list of the Formalized
Version of the Russell-Myhill Paradox (3.7) should be the Typed Choice Schema (4.4). On
this way of putting the matter, the predicative response to the paradox is to deny the type-
theoretic version of the Cantor’s Theorem (3.2) and to remain ambivalent on the Predicative
Typed Choice Schema (4.8). Again, by the results of the next section, it’s consistent for the
predicative response to assume the Predicative Typed Choice Schema (4.8), but what we have
sought to emphasize in these paragraphs is that the reasons which motivate the predicative
restrictions on the comprehension schema don’t obviously motivate any instances of either
the impredicative or predicative choice schema.
5 The Consistency of the Predicative Response
In this section, we take up the task of demonstrating the Predicative Consistency Theo-
rem (4.12). The reader who is uninterested in this result or merely willing to accept it
conditionally might elect to pass on directly to the next section, since the details of this sec-
tion will not be needed for understanding the subsequent sections of this paper. The most
fundamental idea in the proof is to replace the use of the cumulative hierarchy of sets as
deployed in the usual model theory of type systems with the constructible hierarchy of sets.
15Presumably this motivation for the restriction on the quantifiers in the Predicative Typed Comprehension
Schema (4.6) likewise motivates the restriction on the higher-order parameters in this schema. In this it’s
helpful to recall the worked-out example above of the higher-order parameters D and C. As one can see by
inspecting equations (4.10) and (4.11) above, higher-order parameters are able to go proxy for higher-order
quantifiers. Given this, if one wants to employ a description featuring a higher-order parameter to stably
refer to a lower-order entity, then it’s natural to require that this higher-order parameter likewise not shift
in extension under variations of the range of the higher-order quantifiers.
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Before recalling the definitions of the cumulative hierarchy and the constructible hierarchy of
sets, let’s then first recall how the usual model theory for type theory proceeds. Let’s restrict
attention to the extensional fragment of the types which contains the type e for objects, the
type t for truth-values, and which contains the type ab of functions from entities of type a
to entities of type b whenever it contains type a and type b; and moreover, let’s consider
the extensional language which is bereft of the presentation symbols and the intensional
application symbols and which contains only the extensional application symbols.
Models for the extensional fragment of type theory usually begin with an assignment
of domains Da to each type a. The procedure here is that the type e of objects is assigned
some arbitrary domain De = E, the type t of truth-values is assigned the set Dt = {0, 1} of
truth-values (0 for “false” and 1 for “true”), and the type ab is assigned the domain Dab of
all functions f : Da → Db, which is sometimes written in exponential notation as DDab (cf.
[45] p. 28, [42] pp. 84, 121):
(5.1) De = E, Dt = {0, 1}, Dab = DDab = {f : Da → Db}
To see the connection with the cumulative hierarchy of sets, recall that we can identify sets
with their characteristic functions (cf. equation (3.1)). Further, recall that
(5.2) The power set P (X) of a given set X is defined to be the set of all the subsets Y
of X, that is, P (X) = {Y : Y ⊆ X}.
Hence, we can identify the sets in P (Da) with the functions in Dat. For the moment, let’s
write Dat ≈ P (Da) as a shorthand for this identification. Iterating this, we can build the
following sequence in a very straightforward manner:
(5.3) De = E, Det ≈ P (E), D(et)t ≈ P (P (E)), D((et)t)t ≈ P (P (P (E))), . . .
From this perspective, the usual model theory for the extensional theory of types is closely
related to iterations of the powerset operator.
This kind of sequence is of course also built into the standard conception of the set-
theoretic universe, namely the cumulative hierarchy. In particular, the axioms of set theory
guarantee that the universe V of sets is identical to the union of the following sequence of
sets Vα, where α is an ordinal (cf. [57] p. 95, [49] p. 64, [48] p. 257):
(5.4) V0 = ∅, Vα+1 = P (Vα), Vα =
⋃
β<α
Vβ, α limit
One of Go¨del’s many important innovations in set theory was the definition of the con-
structible hierarchy of sets. The definition of this hierarchy is identical to the definition of
the cumulative hierarchy except at the successor steps, where instead of looking at the full
powerset of the previous step, one looks at a certain class of definable subsets of the previous
step. In particular, we define, in contrast to the definition of the powerset (5.2) above:
(5.5) The collection of definable subsets Defn(X) of a given set is defined to be the set
of all subsets Y of X such that there is a first-order formula in the language of
set theory ϕ(x, z1, . . . , zn) with all free variables displayed and parameters q1, . . . , qn
from X such that Y = {x ∈ X : (X,∈) |= ϕ(x, q1, . . . , qn)}.
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For instance X is in Defn(X) since X = {x ∈ X : (X,∈) |= x = x} and the empty set ∅
is in Defn(X) since ∅ = {x ∈ X : (X,∈) |= x 6= x}. Go¨del then defined the constructible
hierarchy as follows (cf. [57] p. 166, [58] p. 134, [49] p. 174, [24] p. 58):
(5.6) L0 = ∅, Lα+1 = Defn(Lα), Lα =
⋃
β<α
Lβ, α limit
and he defined the constructible universe L to be the union of the sets from the constructible
hierarchy. Go¨del further showed that the constructible universe models all of the axioms of
set theory, so that this is not just another collection of sets but an alternative set theoretic
universe.
The key idea in our proof of the Predicative Consistency Theorem (4.12) is to assign the
types to levels of the constructible hierarchy. To do this, we need to work with a very specific
kind of level of the constructible hierarchy. This kind of level was first defined by Kripke
([56]) and Platek ([69]), who had the idea that some initial segments of the constructible
hierarchy can’t “tell” that they are tall, and actually think that they can be “shrunk”, and
this idea was later famously employed by Jensen ([50]) in his proof of the uniformization
theorem. Formally one defines this important notion as follows (cf. [50] pp. 256-257, [82]
Definition 2.1 p. 619, [24] p. 156, [81] p. 157, Barwise [6] Definition V.6.1 p. 174, [56] p.
162, [94]):
(5.7) the n-th projectum ρn(α) is the smallest ρ ≤ α such that there is a Σ˜Lαn -definableinjection ι : Lα → ρ.
In this, Σ˜n-definability is first-order definability in the sense at issue in the definition of Defn(X)above in equation (5.5), but restricted to first-order formulas which begin with a block of
alternating quantifiers of length n starting with an existential quantifier (and allowing pa-
rameters). Further, when not clear from context, one writes Σ˜Lαn to emphasize that thedefinability is with respect to the structure Lα.
Now we can proceed to a description of our models. Our most important definition is
the following definition of an intensional position (5.8). The motivation for this name comes
in the subsequent definition of an intensional hierarchy (5.9) which is given by a collection of
intensional positions, which intuitively are “positions” for the higher-order variables within
the hierarchy.16 While the definition of an intensional position is admittedly complicated,
the broader significance of each element of this definition will be borne out by the subsequent
discussion in this section:
(5.8) An intensional position p is a given by a sextuple p = (α, `, ι,O, pi, ν) wherein (i) the
ordinal α > ω is a limit , (ii) ` is a positive natural number such that Lα is a model of
the Σ`-collection schema and the Σ`−1 separation schema, (iii) the ordinal α has non-
trivial `-th projectum α0 = ρ`(α) < α with ι : Lα → α0 a witnessing Σ˜Lα` -definable
16The language of “positions” is apt because, as one can see from inspection of the below definitions, one
intensional position can provide the interpretation of the n-th order quantifiers in one intensional hierarchy
but the interpretation of the m-th order quantifiers in another.
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injection, (iv) the set O is a Σ˜Lα` -definable subset of α0, (v) the map pi : O 99K Lα is
a Σ˜Lα` -definable partial surjective function such that pi ◦ ι is the identity on Lα and
such that O\pi−1(Lα) is Σ˜Lα` -definable and (vi) the definability in each of the previousitems is with respect to the parameter ν from Lα.
In part (ii) of this definition, the Σn-collection schema is the axiom schema which says that
if ϕ(x, y) is a Σn-formula and for all x ∈ a there is y such that ϕ(x, y), then there is a set b
such that for all x ∈ a there is y ∈ b with ϕ(x, y). In essence, Σn-collection says that when
for everything in an antecedently specified set a there is a witness to a Σn-condition, then
at least one witness for everything in a may be bounded or collected together in another
set b. The Σn-separation schema is simply the separation schema from the ambient set
theory restricted to the case of Σn-formulas: it says that if ϕ(x) is a Σn formula and a is a
set then there is another set b such that z ∈ b iff z ∈ a ∧ ϕ(z). In essence, Σn-separation
just says that all the Σn-subsets of antecedently specified a set exist. Further, it’s worth
mentioning that the concept of an ordinal α being `-admissible from [94] is equivalent to
conditions (i)-(ii) of the definition of an intensional position, so that intensional hierarchies
are just certain collections of `-admissibles for increasing values of `. This generalizes the
notion of Kripke-Platek set theory since in the case ` = 1, a structure Lα is `-admissible just
in case it is a model of this set theory ([56], [69], Devlin [24] p. 48, p. 36).
Having all this in place, we may now define the notion of an intensional hierarchy :
(5.9) An intensional hierarchy D = (p1, p2, . . .) is given by a countable sequence pn =
(αn, `n, ιn,On, pin, νn) of intensional positions such that (i) for all n,m ≥ 1 it is the
case that ρ`n(αn) = ρ`m(αm) = α0, and (ii) the associated sequence of ordinals is
strictly increasing: α0 < α1 < α2 < · · · < αn < αn+1 < · · · .
One example of an intensional hierarchy is related to definite descriptions. Let λ be a
cardinal in Go¨del’s constructible universe L, and let κ = λ+ be the next biggest cardinal
in L, as judged by L. Further, let Mn = dcl
Lκ
Σn
(λ ∪ {λ}) be the sets in Lκ that have Σn-
definite descriptions over Lκ with parameters from λ ∪ {λ}. Then it can be shown that
that Mn = Lαn for some α with λ < αn < αn+1 < κ and that ρn(αn) = λ. For more details
on the construction described in this paragraph, see [94], and in particular the existence
theorem.17
17It’s worth spelling out exactly how one defines On and pin, by more specific reference to the details of
the Existence Theorem of [94] and in particular to the function θn defined therein. The simplest way is
to take On = θ−1n (Lαn) and to define pin = θn  On. Since θn : Fn 99K Lαn is Σ˜Lαnn -definable and Fn
is Σ˜Lαn1 -definable, On will be Σ˜Lαnn -definable, and the total surjective map pin : On → Lαn will be similarly
definable. Because it is total, trivially On \ pi−1n (Lαn) is Σ˜Lαnn -definable because it is, well, empty. Since pinis designed to provide the interpretation of ∆a for each type a of degree n (cf. subsequent discussion circa
equation (5.13)), clearly this interpretation clashes with the intended interpretation of the presentation
functions, on which they would be partial. To reinstitute partiality, choose any subset Pn ⊆ Fn \ θ−1n (Lαn)
which is Σ˜Lαnn -definable and then define O′n = θ−1n (Lαn)∪Pn and define pi′n = θn  O′n, making sure to buildthe parameters defining Pn into νn. For instance, one could take Pn to be any finite subset of Fn \θ−1n (Lαn).
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Each intensional hierarchy D naturally gives rise to a model of Church’s core sys-
tem (2.8). In particular, we assign types to domains as follows:
(5.10) De = α0, Dt = {0, 1}, Dab = DbDa ∩ Lα‖ab‖ , Da′ = O‖a‖
In this, recall that a 7→ ‖a‖ is the degree of the type a, as defined in (4.5). So the parallel
to the usual semantics for extensional type theory becomes vivid. In particular, whereas
these usual semantics employ the cumulative hierarchy to assign domains to types, here our
semantics for our intensional type theory uses the constructible hierarchy to assign domains
to types. For instance, instead of assigning ab the set DDab = {f : Da → Db}, we only assign
it those elements of this set which are in the constructible hierarchy at an appropriate level.
So we’re only putting those higher-order entities of type ab in the range of the higher-order
quantifiers when it has entered a level of the constructible hierarchy which is coordinated
with the degree of the type ab.
Having defined intensional hierarchies, our next goal is to say how to interpret the exten-
sional application symbols (f, x) 7→ f(x), the presentation symbols ∆a, and the intensional
application symbols (f ′, a′) 7→ f ′〈x′〉 on intensional hierarchies. In providing these interpre-
tations, we shall be associating each intensional hierarchy D to an intensional structure D
augmented by these interpretations. Further, as we go along, we shall also show that various
axioms are true on these intensional structures. However, prior to doing this, we need to
state the following elementary result about how the domains Da of an intensional hierarchy
relate to the sets Lαn :
(5.11) (Proposition on the Location of Domains) For all n ≥ 1, both of the following hold:
(I) for all types a with ‖a‖ < n, there is a Σ1-formula in parameter µn such
that Da is the unique element of Lαn which satisfies this formula, wherein µn is
defined by µn = 〈ν1, . . . , νn, α0, α1, . . . , αn−1〉.
(II) for all types a with ‖a‖ = n, the set Da is a Σ˜`n-definable subset of Lαn inparameter µn.
For a proof, see Appendix 1 §9. This result is important because it tells us that the do-
main Da is a subset of Lα‖a‖ , so that we can locate the domain Da amongst the levels of the
constructible hierarchy by calculating the degree of the type a. Further, from this we can
deduce the following:
(5.12) (Proposition on Domain and Codomain of Projectum Witnesses) For all types a, one
has that restriction ι‖a‖  Da has domain Da and codomain Da′ , i.e. ι‖a‖  Da : Da →
Da′ .
To see this, let n = ‖a‖. By the Proposition on the Location of Domains, Da is a subset
of the domain Lαn of the injection ιn : Lαn → α0. Hence the restriction notation ι‖a‖  Da
makes good sense. Suppose now that x is a member of Da and set y = ι‖a‖(x). Since pin ◦ ιn
is the identity function on Lαn , we have that y is in the domain of pi‖a‖, which by definition
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is a subset of O‖a‖ = Da′ . This, in any case, is the elementary argument which characterizes
the Domain and Codomain of the Projectum Witnesses (5.12).
Given an intensional hierarchy D, there is a natural interpretation of the presentation
symbols ∆a such that the Typed Sense Determines Reference Axiom (2.4) is true on the
induced intensional structure D. In particular, the presentation functional ∆a is interpreted
on an intensional hierarchy D as the binary relation on Da′ ×Da defined by
(5.13) ∆a(f
′, f)⇐⇒ pi‖a‖(f ′) = f
That is, ∆a is interpreted as the graph of pi‖a‖ restricted to Da′ × Da. This definition
makes good sense. For, suppose that f ′ is from Da′ = O‖a‖ and f is from Da. Then
by the Proposition on Location of Domains (5.11), we have that f ∈ Da ⊆ Lα‖a‖ and by
definition pi‖a‖ : O‖a‖ 99K Lα‖a‖ .
We just showed how to expand an intensional hierarchy D to an intensional structure D
which has an interpretation of the presentation symbols. Now let us verify that the Typed
Sense Determines Reference Axiom (2.4) is true on the intensional structure D. For the ease
of readability, we reproduce this axiom here:
(2.4) Typed Sense Determines Reference: (∆a(f
′, f) & ∆a(f ′, g)) =⇒ f = g
Suppose that ∆a(f
′, f) and ∆a(f ′, g). Then by definition in equation (5.13), we have
that pi‖a‖(f ′) = f and pi‖a‖(f ′) = g. Since pi‖a‖ : O‖a‖ 99K Lα‖a‖ is a partial function, it then
follows that f = g. Since the Typed Sense Determines Reference Axiom (2.4) comes out
true on this interpretation of the presentation symbols, we have that the presentation symbol
is functional. Just as when working in the object language of Church’s core system (2.8),
instead of writing ∆a(f
′, f), we shall write ∆a(f ′) = f . Likewise, we shall write ∆a(f ′)↓ to
indicate that there is f such that ∆a(f
′) = f (cf. discussion subsequent to (2.1) in §2).
It remains to indicate the interpretation of the extensional application symbols (f, x) 7→
f(x) and the intensional application symbols (f ′, a′) 7→ f ′〈x′〉. The extensional appli-
cation symbols are comparatively straightforward: these are interpreted as the function
from Dab × Da to Db given by the notion of extensional application from the metatheory.
This makes sense because, per the definition of Dab in equation (5.10), every element of Dab
is a function f : Da → Db. It’s perhaps worth underscoring that for each pair of types a, b,
there is a separate extensional application symbol in the signature of Church’s core sys-
tem (2.8). We can usually ignore this since their interpretation is uniform. But, in what
follows, if we need to explicitly display the types of an extensional application symbol, we
shall write e-appab(f, x) instead of f(x) for the extensional application symbols.
Likewise, we shall sometimes write i-appab(f
′, x′) instead of f ′〈x′〉 for the intensional
application symbols, again to highlight the fact that there is one of these symbols for each
pair of types a, b. We interpret these symbols on an intensional hierarchy as follows:
(5.14) i-appab(f
′, x′) = f ′〈x′〉 = ι‖b‖((∆abf ′)(∆ax′))
From what we know about the interpretation of the presentation functions and the result on
the Domain and Codomain of the Projectum Witnesses (5.12), we see that the intensional
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application function is a partial function i-appab : D(ab)′×Da′ 99K Db′ . As with the discussion
of the partial presentation functions, technically in the formal system we shall identify the
intensional application function with its graph, which is a ternary relation on D(ab)′ ×Da′ ×
Db′ . As with presentation symbols, when we write i-appab(f
′, x′) all by itself, it is assumed
that this is defined.
Now, let’s show that the Typed Composition Axiom (2.5) comes out true on this inter-
pretation. For the ease of readability, we reproduce this axiom here:
(2.5) Typed Composition: [∆ab(f
′) = f & ∆a(x′) = x] =⇒ ∆b(f ′〈x′〉) = f(x)
Suppose that ∆ab(f
′) = f and ∆a(x′) = x. Then by its definition in equation (5.14), we see
that f ′〈x′〉 is defined. Then we may evaluate the term ∆b(f ′〈x′〉) as follows:
(5.15) ∆b(ι‖b‖((∆abf ′)(∆ax′))) = ∆b(ι‖b‖(f(x))) = (pi‖b‖ ◦ ι‖b‖)(f(x)) = f(x)
where the last equality follows from the fact that pi‖b‖ ◦ ι‖b‖ is the identity function on the
set Lα‖b‖ (cf. clause (v) in the definition of an intensional position (5.8)). This is why the
Typed Composition Axiom (2.5) comes out true on intensional structures.
Finally, let’s note why the Surjectivity Axiom (3.8) and the Senses are Objects Ax-
iom (3.9) are rather trivially true on intensional structures. As for surjectivity, suppose that f
is an element of domain Da. Again, by the Proposition on Location of Domains (5.11), we
have that Da is a subset of Lα‖a‖ . Since pi‖a‖ : O‖a‖ 99K Lα‖a‖ is partial surjective, choose f ′
from O‖a‖ such that pi‖a‖(f ′) = f . Then since we have the identity Da′ = O‖a‖ (cf. equa-
tion (5.10)) and since ∆a is interpreted as the graph of pi‖a‖ restricted to Da′ × Da (cf.
equation (5.13)), we have that ∆a(f
′) = f . This is why the Surjectivity Axiom (3.8) comes
out true on intensional structures. As for the Senses are Objects Axiom (3.9), suppose
that a is a type. By definition, we have the identities De = α0 and Da′ = O‖a‖ (cf. equa-
tion (5.10)), and by the definition of an intensional position we have that O‖a‖ ⊆ α0 (cf.
part (iv) of (5.8)). Hence, on intensional structures, it is indeed the case that every sense or
intension is identical to an object.
The Propositions as Fine-Grained as Objects Axiom (3.10) requires the following defi-
nition:
(5.16) An intensional position p = (α, `, ι,O, pi, ν) is expressive if there is an injection χ :
α0 → pi−1({0, 1}) whose graph is an element of Lα. An intensional hierarchy is
expressive if each position in it is expressive.
There are expressive intensional hierarchies (cf. the existence theorem in [94]), and any
expressive intensional hierarchy models the Propositions as Fine-Grained as Objects Ax-
iom (3.10). In particular, take the injection χ1 : α0 → pi−11 ({0, 1}). Since De = α0
and Dt = {0, 1} and Dt′ = O1 (cf. equation (5.10)), it follows that pi−11 ({0, 1}) ⊆ O1 = Dt′ ,
so that χ1 : De → Dt′ is an injection. Moreover, this injection also maps objects to propo-
sitions which present a truth-value. For, note that ∆t(χ1(x)) is defined for each x from De
since χ1(x) ∈ pi−11 ({0, 1}). Hence expressive intensional structures model the Propositions
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as Fine-Grained as Objects Axiom (3.10) in an interesting way since we may inject objects
into propositions that actually succeed in presenting truth-values.
To finish the proof of the Predicative Consistency Theorem (4.12), it remains to establish
that intensional structures are indeed models of the predicative versions of comprehension:
(5.17) (Theorem on Consistency of Predicative Comprehension) For every intensional hi-
erarchy D (5.9), the associated intensional structure D models each instance of the
Predicative Typed Choice Schema (4.8) and hence each instance of the Predicative
Typed Comprehension Schema (4.6).
The proof of this is completed in Appendix 2 §10, since it is comparatively technical in
nature. But with this, the proof of the Theorem on the Consistency of Predicative Compre-
hension (5.17) is finished.
In this section we have described models of certain extensions of Church’s Core Sys-
tem (2.8), and before closing this section it’s worth dwelling on one feature of these models
related to the Senses are Objects Axiom (3.9). This axiom requires that there be non-trivial
identities between different types. While perhaps obvious, it’s worth underscoring how this
effected. Formally, one simply makes identity an untyped binary relation in the definition
of well-formed formulas, as is not uncommon in many-sorted logics (cf. [59] p. 229, [34] p.
16 footnote 10). On this approach and hence in the models described in this section, identity
is simply interpreted as the usual identity relation from the ambient metatheory. One im-
mediate consequence of this approach is that it is only items of syntax such as variables and
terms which have a unique type, whereas elements of a domain of a model can have more
than one type. This happens more often than one might initially suspect. For instance, the
standard semantics for second-order logic is routinely formalized in a many-sorted setting
wherein models are given by a pair (M,P (M)) wherein the non-empty set M serves as the
interpretation of the first-order variables and wherein its powerset P (M) serves as the inter-
pretation of the second-order variables. But if M is a transitive set such as an ordinal, then
M is a subset of P (M) and so the two are not at all disjoint. The fact that any finite ordinal
is both a first-order object and a second-order object in the standard model of second-order
arithmetic (ω, P (ω)) has never engendered any confusion. Similarly, while the Senses are
Objects Axiom (3.9) may be objectionable on purely philosophical grounds, the non-trivial
identities between types inherent in it pose no problems for the model theory of such typed
systems.
6 Church’s Other Axiom and Gallin’s Intensional Logic
Church included another axiom in his own formulation which we have omitted in our original
description of his intensional logic in §2. The strongest version of this axiom is the following,
where recall that the “downarrow” notation ↓ indicates that the partial function is defined
on that value (cf. discussion immediately after (2.1) in §2):
(6.1) Iterative Axiom: ∀ f ′, g′ [∆ab(f ′)↓6= ∆ab(g′)↓]→
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[∃ x′, x (∆a(x′) = x & ∆b(f ′〈x′〉) 6= ∆b(g′〈x′〉))]
The motivation for this axiom is less obvious and Church said less explicitly on this subject.
In my view, the best way to conceive of the motivation is as being expressive of a priority
of lower-order senses over higher-order senses. The idea is that a canonical way to discern a
difference between the presentations of higher-order senses is via a difference at the level of
the presentations of propositions. So one knows that the sense of “wise” presents a different
concept than the sense of “courageous” in part because one knows that, say, the sense of
“Zeno is wise” presents the true while the sense of “Zeno has courage” presents the false.
In Church’s papers, this axiom was rather expressed contrapositively as follows (cf.
Church’s Axiom 16 [15] p. 19, [52] pp. 108-109, [1] pp. 219, 224 ff):
(6.2) [(∀ x, x′(∆a(x′) = x⇒ ∆b(f ′〈x′〉) = f(x))) & ∆ab(f ′)↓] =⇒ ∆ab(f ′) = f
In the presence of the Surjectivity Axiom (3.8) and the other axioms of Church’s core sys-
tem (2.8), this version follows deductively from the Iterative Axiom (6.1). To show this,
suppose that the antecedent of (6.2) holds but the consequent fails, so that ∆ab(f
′)↓6=f . By
the Surjectivity Axiom (3.8), choose g′ of type (ab)′ such that ∆ab(g′) = f . Then ∆ab(f ′)↓6=
∆ab(g
′)↓. Then by the Iterative Axiom (6.1), we have that there is x′, x such that ∆a(x′) = x
and ∆b(f
′〈x′〉) 6= ∆b(g′〈x′〉). By the Typed Composition Axiom (2.5), we then have that
(6.3) ∆b(f
′〈x′〉) 6= ∆b(g′〈x′〉) = (∆ab(g′))(∆a(x′)) = f(x)
which contradicts the hypothesis that the antecedent of (6.2) is satisfied. This is the sense
in which the Iterative Axiom (6.1) generalizes Church’s own axiom in (6.2).
It turns out that the Iterative Axiom (6.1) (and thus also (6.2)) are true on the models
that we have constructed in the previous section. This is not an accident but rather follows
from some additional resources that one has available in these models, resources which allow
one to interpret a fragment of Gallin’s intensional logic. In particular, let us expand Church’s
core system (2.8) with a new function symbol ∇a for each type a, called the representation
function, which takes entities of type a and returns an entity of type a′. Intuitively, the
idea is that the representation ∇a function takes an extension f of type a and returns an
intension f ′ of type a′ which presents f . More formally we have the following axiom:
(6.4) Representation Axiom: For each entity f of type a, one has that ∇a(f) is an entity
of type a′ such that ∆a(∇a(f)) = f .
Note that it follows from this that the representation function ∇a is an injection from entities
of type a to entities of type a′. For, suppose that ∇a(f) = ∇a(g). Then by applying the
presentation function to each side and by applying the Representation Axiom (6.4) one has
that
(6.5) f = ∆a(∇a(f)) = ∆a(∇a(g)) = g
Finally, it’s perhaps also worth explicitly mentioning that the Representation Axiom (6.4)
formally implies the Surjectivity Axiom (3.8). For the Surjectivity Axiom (3.8) says that
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each entity f of type a is presented by some intension f ′ of type a′, and the Represen-
tation Axiom (6.4) actually says that one can select the intension f ′ to be equal to the
representation ∇a(f).
The models which we have constructed in the previous section admit a natural inter-
pretation of the representation function on which the Representation Axiom (6.4) comes out
true. In particular, given an intensional hierarchy D (5.9), we may interpret the representa-
tion function ∇a as the injection ι‖a‖ which comes built into the intensional hierarchy (where
again ‖ · ‖ denotes the degree function (4.5) on types). The Representation Axiom (6.4)
comes out true on intensional structures simply because an intensional hierarchy was built
around the idea that the interpretation of the representation function is a (right) inverse
to the interpretation of the presentation functions (cf. clause (v) in the definition of an
intensional position (5.8) as well as the Proposition on Domain and Codomain of Projec-
tum Witnesses (5.12)). Further, as we verify in Appendix 2 §10, the resulting intensional
structure continues to model the predicative comprehension schemata (4.6)-(4.8).
The representation functions are relevant to Church’s Iterative Axiom due to another
axiom which holds true on the models from the last section, namely:
(6.6) Characterization of Intensional Application: f ′〈x′〉 = ∇b((∆ab(f ′)(∆a(x′)))
One can easily check that this axiom comes out true on intensional structures by glancing at
how intensional application was defined in equation (5.14). This axiom just brings into the
object language what was implicit in our constructions in the previous section. Intuitively,
what this axiom is saying is that intensional application of a functional intension to an
intension simply consists in figuring out what extension is presented by each, performing
extensional application on these referents, and then going back to an intension via the
representation function. Given this axiom, intensional application can be defined in terms
of extensional application and the representation and presentation functions.
Before turning to the connection between the representation function and Church’s
Iterative Axiom (6.1), let’s note that the axioms governing the representation function allow
us to capture a fragment of Gallin’s intensional logic IL (cf. [41] Chapter 1). Gallin’s work
can be seen as an attempt to axiomatize Montague grammar ([25] Chapters 6-8, [42] Chapter
6). Montague grammar in turn can be viewed as an attempt to develop a logic motivated
by possible worlds semantics in which one can distinguish between the intension and the
extension of a given expression, while at the same time not having to actually quantify over
possible worlds in the object-language (cf. [41] p. 58, [25] p. 161). To this end, Montague
articulated a type system– now familiar to us– in which for any type a there was a type sa
which in the standard model theory is interpreted as functions from worlds to entities of
type a. Montague then postulated that for every well-formed expression f of type a there
is an intension f̂ of type sa and for every well-formed expression f ′ of type sa there is an
extension
̂
f ′ of type a.
Gallin’s later axiomatization can be seen as an attempt to see what is true on all models
described by Montague. Some of the crucial axioms that Gallin set out in this intensional
logic were the following (cf. [41] p. 19):
(6.7) Axiom A2 : ∀ x, y [x̂ = ŷ =⇒ f̂(x) = f̂(y)]
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(6.8) Axiom A3 : [∀ x (f̂(x) = ĝ(x))] =⇒ f̂ = ĝ]
(6.9) Axiom AS6 :
̂
f̂ = f
If we interpret the sa as a′ and we interpret f̂ by∇a(f) when f is of type a and we interpret
̂
f ′
as ∆a(f
′) when f ′ is of type a′, then we can easily deduce these three axioms. Hence,
the system of Church’s intensional logic expanded with the resources of the representation
function interprets a fragment of Gallin’s intensional logic. One can see this observation as a
partial converse to Kaplan’s aforementioned possible-worlds model of Church’s core system
(cf. circa (2.9)). The other axioms of Gallin’s intensional logic concern modal notions
and lambda-terms. The system developed in this paper will have little to say about them
because on the one hand it is not a modal system, and on the other hand lambda-terms, as
is well known, have the force of effecting the satisfaction of the full Typed Comprehension
Schema (4.1), which we do not have in our predicative setting.
In addition to their interest in providing for this interpretation of a fragment of Gallin’s
intensional logic, the axioms pertaining to the representation function are of interest because
they deductively entail Church’s Iterative Axiom.18 But in the literature on Church’s inten-
sional logic, the ideas behind the Iterative Axiom (6.1) and the associated principle (6.2)
have been criticized by Parsons and Klement ([68] p. 517, [54] pp. 165-166). As Anderson
later put it, the general concern is that the Iterative Axiom (6.1) is “really quite at odds with
the heuristic ideas” of Church’s intensional logic, namely the formalization of fine-grained
meanings ([5] p. 161). One way to see the nature of this concern is to adopt the richer
perspective where we have access to the representation function. For, the axioms governing
the representation function have the following consequence:
(6.12) Characterization of Intensional Injectivity : A function f of type ab is injective if and
only if for any f ′ of type (ab)′ such that ∆ab(f ′) = f , one has that f ′〈x′〉 = f ′〈y′〉
implies ∆a(x
′) = ∆a(y′).
18To see this, suppose that the antecedent of the Iterative Axiom (6.1) held, so that ∆ab(f
′) was defined
and not equal to ∆ab(g
′). Then let f = ∆ab(f ′) and let g = ∆ab(g′). Since f, g are functional entities
of type ab, it must be the case that they differ on some value (cf. (2.6)), so that there is an object x of
type a such that f(x) 6= g(x). Now consider the representation x′ = ∇a(x) of this entity x. Then by the
Representation Axiom (6.4), we have that x′ presents x, or that ∆a(x′) = x. Now, using the Characterization
of Intensional Application (6.6), let us quickly compute f ′〈x′〉 and g′〈x′〉:
f ′〈x′〉 = ∇b((∆ab(f ′)(∆a(x′))) = ∇b(f(x))(6.10)
g′〈x′〉 = ∇b((∆ab(g′)(∆a(x′))) = ∇b(g(x))(6.11)
Now, to finish the verification of the Iterative Axiom (6.1), suppose for the sake of contradiction
that ∆b(f
′〈x′〉) = ∆b(g′〈x′〉). Then by the previous calculations, we see that ∆b(∇b(f(x))) = ∆b(∇b(g(x))).
By the Representation Axiom (6.4), it then follows that f(x) = g(x), contrary to hypothesis. Hence, this is
why the axioms pertaining to the representation function deductively imply the Iterative Axiom (6.1).
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The proof of this characterization is comparatively straightforward and so we relegate it to
a footnote.19 The Parsons-Klement concern can be expressed thusly: this characterization
grates against some natural intuitions that one might have about fine-grained meanings.20
Indeed, take any non-injective function that might occur naturally in language, like “the
father of.” If we take a = e and b = e and think of all the objects as consisting of persons,
then this is a non-injective function f of type ab. Let’s further assume for the sake of
concreteness that intensions of persons are definite descriptions of some kind: the Φ, the Ψ,
etc. Then the Characterization of Intensional Injectivity (6.12) implies that there is some
sense the father of which presents the father-of function f and which is such that the
intension the father of 〈the Φ〉 is the same qua intension as the father of 〈the Ψ〉,
despite the fact that the person who is the Φ is not the same as the person who is the Ψ.
But consequences like this seem highly counterintuitive: one might rather have thought
that if the the father of 〈the best xylophone player〉 is the same qua intension as
the father of 〈the best yazheng player〉, then the best xylophone player is the best
yazheng player. (The “xylophone” and “yazheng” are two musical instruments which start
with the same letters that are used as the variables in (6.12)). However, what we now see
is that if one accepts the Characterization of Intensional Application (6.6), then one must
to accept consequences like this. For, on this characterization of intensional application, the
19First suppose that f is injective and that f ′ presents f and that we have the identity f ′〈x′〉 = f ′〈y′〉.
By the Characterization of Intensional Application (6.6), we then have the identity
(6.13) ∇b((∆ab(f ′))(∆a(x′))) = ∇b((∆ab(f ′))(∆a(y′)))
But since the representation function ∇b is an injection and since f ′ presents f , this reduces to the iden-
tity f(∆a(x
′)) = f(∆a(y′)) and since f is an injection, we have ∆a(x′) = ∆a(y′), which is what we wanted
to show. This completes the verification of the left-to-right direction of (6.12).
For the right-to-left direction of (6.12), suppose that f satisfies the right-hand side of (6.12). Suppose for
the sake of contradiction that f is not an injection, so that f(x) = f(y) but x 6= y. Then let x′ = ∇a(x)
and y′ = ∇a(y) and f ′ = ∇ab(f), so that the Representation Axiom (6.4) implies that x′ presents x and y′
presents y and f ′ presents f . Then we can expand the identity f(x) = f(y) to
(6.14) (∆abf
′)(∆a(x′)) = f(x) = f(y) = (∆abf ′)(∆a(y′))
Then by applying the representation function ∇b to each side and appealing to the Characterization of the
Intensional Application (6.6), we have that f ′〈x′〉 = f ′〈y′〉. Then by the hypothesis that f ′ satisfies the
right-hand side of (6.12), we have that ∆a(x
′) = ∆a(y′), and since x′ presents x and y′ presents y, we
have that x = y, which contradicts the reductio assumption that x 6= y. This completes the argument that
the Characterization of Intensional Injectivity (6.12) follows from our axioms governing the representation
function.
20See in particular Klement [54] pp. 165-166. But this is only one aspect of the concern of Parsons and
Klement. First, Parsons was most interested in the interaction of Church’s other axiom (6.2) with senses
which do not present any referent ([68] p. 517). Second, Klement was also concerned with unintuitive
consequences of (6.2) related to the intent ionality of senses (cf. [54] p. 164). A deeper question raised by
the work of Parsons and Klement is what analogues there are of the Typed Comprehension Schema (4.1) for
type (ab)′. This is relevant because Parsons and Klement’s counterexamples to Church’s other axiom (6.2)
are engendered by combining senses or intensions of type (ab)′ together in various ways, a procedure which
would be most naturally warranted by a version of the comprehension schema for senses or intensions of
type (ab)′.
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intension associated to the the father of 〈the best xylophone player〉 is not the
definite description which we normally associate to the linguistic expression “the father of
the best xylophone player.” Rather, on this characterization of intensional application, the
intension the father of 〈the best xylophone player〉 is the result of intensionally
applying the intensional functional the father of to the input of the intension the best
xylophone player.
Indeed, on the conception following from the Characterization of Intensional Applica-
tion (6.6), this is done by first by figuring out who the father of the best xylophone player
actually is– perhaps its Ted– and going and figuring out what the representation of Ted is
– perhaps it is the mayor of Montreal. Now Ted might have two children, Alice and
Bob, and it might turn out that Alice is best xylophone player while Bob is the best yazheng
player. On this conception, the intension associated to the the father of 〈the best
xylophone player〉 is identical to the intension associated to the father of 〈the best
yazheng player〉 since both are identical to the intension the mayor of Montreal.
But in spite of this identity, the person presented by the intension the best xylophone
player is Alice, who is distinct from her sibling Bob, who is presented by the intension the
best yazheng player.
Thus the Characterization of Intensional Application (6.6) requires us to depart from
some of the original ambitions of a fine-grained theory of intensions, on which intensional
injectivity would presumably be the rule rather than the exception.21 It is not presently
obvious to us whether there is a proof of the Predicative Consistency Theorem (4.12) which
would produce models which do not validate either the Characterization of Intensional In-
jectivity (6.12) or the Iterative Axiom (6.1). If one rejects Church’s Axiom of Type Re-
duction (2.7) then the most difficult part of any construction of a model of these systems
is to provide an interpretation of the intensional application function (f ′, x′) 7→ f ′〈x′〉. All
the constructions which we have come up with so far have involved the aforementioned
characterization of intensional application (6.6) and hence the Iterative Axiom (6.1).
7 Wehmeier and the Problem of Many Non-Extensions
In this paper, we’ve been primarily concerned with describing the predicative response to the
Russell-Myhill paradox. However, as we’ve seen, predicativity constraints block the normal
proof of the type-theoretic version of Cantor’s Theorem (3.2). Since this theorem is closely
related to Russell’s paradox, it’s natural to think that there is a connection between the
predicative response to the Russell-Myhill paradox of propositions and consistent fragments
of the so-called naive conception of set.
To see this connection, let’s note the precise way in which we can use axioms introduced
thus far to produce violations of the type-theoretic version of Cantor’s Theorem (3.2). In
particular, let’s note why these axioms give us reason to endorse the following principle:
21For instance, some of the systems of Church and Anderson explicitly included axioms for the injectivity
of senses of functional expressions. See the axiom designated “64” in Church [16] p. 151 and Anderson [1]
p. 222.
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(7.1) There is an injection ∂ from entities of type et to entities of type e such that for all f
of type et there is f ′ of type (et)′ satisfying ∆et(f ′) = f and f ′ = ∂(f).
One proof of this proceeds via the representation function ∇et introduced in the previous
section (cf. circa equation (6.4)). For, one can use the Predicative Typed Comprehension
Schema (4.6) and the Senses are Objects Axiom (3.9) to define the map ∂ as follows, where f
is a variable of type et, x is a variable of type e, and f ′ is a variable of type (et)′:
(7.2) ∂(f) = x⇐⇒ ∃ f ′ (f ′ = ∇et(f) & f ′ = x)
While the representation function ∇et is a function from entities of type et to entities of
type (et)′, the ∂ function is a function from entities of type et to entities of type e. Hence ∂
is an injection since as we noted in the last section the representation function ∇et is an
injection.
A second proof of (7.1) proceeds by recourse to the Predicative Typed Choice Schema (4.8).
For, by the Surjectivity Axiom (3.8) and the Senses are Objects Axiom (3.9), one has the
following, where again f is a variable of type et, x is a variable of type e, and f ′ is a variable
of type (et)′:
(7.3) ∀ f ∃ x [∃ f ′ ∆et(f ′) = f & f ′ = x]
Then by the Predicative Typed Choice Schema (4.8), it follows that there is a function ∂ of
type (et)e such that
(7.4) ∀ f [∃ f ′ ∆et(f ′) = f & f ′ = ∂(f)]
Then we may argue that ∂ is an injection. For suppose that ∂(f) = ∂(g). Then by the
previous equation, there are f ′, g′ such that f ′ = ∂(f) = ∂(g) = g′ and ∆et(f ′) = f
and ∆et(g
′) = g. Then since f ′ = g′, we have that f = ∆et(f ′) = ∆et(g′) = g, so that
the injectivity of ∂ is thereby established.
One of the most traditional versions of the naive conception of set is that found in
Frege’s Grundgesetze ([38], [40]). One of the crucial axioms of this system is Basic Law V,
which postulates the existence of a injection from concepts to objects, which we may call
the extension operator. Now, concepts can be identified with functions of type et (as we
have had numerous occasions to observe in this paper, e.g. circa equation (3.1)). What the
previous paragraphs then show is that the expansions of Church’s intensional logic which
we have studied in this paper afford the resources to satisfy one key postulate of Frege’s
Grundgesetze– namely Basic Law V– along with fragments of the comprehension schema,
such as the Predicative Typed Comprehension Schema (4.6). This consistency result in and
of itself is not new: versions of it were established by Parsons [67], Heck [44], and Ferreira-
Wehmeier [36], and it was the focus of parts of our earlier papers [92], [94]. However, the
argument of the previous paragraphs is new in that it establishes the existence of a particular
species of extension operator, which we might dub a sense-selecting extension operator and
define formally as follows:
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(7.5) A sense-selecting extension operator is an injection ∂ from entities of type et to entities
of type e such that for all f of type et there is f ′ of type (et)′ satisfying ∆et(f ′) = f
and f ′ = ∂(f).
Part of what is added by looking at Frege’s naive conception of set as embedded within a
certain expansion of Church’s intensional logic is that we have access to a particular kind of
extension operator, one on which the extension of a concept is a sense of that concept.22 Of
course this general kind of maneuver is familiar from the literature on the philosophy of set
theory. For instance, the stage axioms of Shoenfield [84], [85], [86] and Boolos [9] constitute
an embedding of a fragment of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory within a theory of “collections
formed in stages.” This gave Shoenfield and Boolos additional resources by which to respond
to the Quinean charge that this set theory was just “wisdom after paradox,” or just one of
many ad-hoc responses to the paradoxes ([77] p. 403, cf. [76] p. 789, [73] pp. 353-354, [75]
p. 5, [60] pp. 111-112).
Similarly, viewing Frege’s set theory in the light of Church’s intensional logic allows
us to respond to a serious objection, due to Wehmeier, with these consistent fragments
of the Grundgesetze. One way to see one’s way towards this objection is to observe that
working within the framework of Church’s intensional logic, we can show that sense-selecting
extension operators have ranges which are indefinitely extensible in the sense of Russell and
Dummett. To this end, let us first define some preliminary subset notation:
(7.6) Subset Notation: If Φ(x) is a formula in one free variable x of type a and f is an
entity of type at, let’s say that h ⊆ Φ if ∀ x (h(x) = 1→ Φ(x)). Likewise, if g is also
of type at, let’s say that h ⊆ g iff ∀ x (h(x) = 1→ g(x) = 1), and let us define h ( g
as h ⊆ g ∧ ¬(g ⊆ h).
Then we may define a formal version of indefinite extensibility as follows:
(7.7) A formula Φ(x) in one free variable x of type a is formally indefinitely extensible if
for each h of type at with h ⊆ Φ there is h˜ of type at such that h ( h˜ ⊆ Φ.
Dummett, following Russell, expressed the idea of indefinite extensibility as follows: “[a]n
indefinitely extensible concept is one such that, if we can form a definite conception of a
totality all of whose members fall under that concept, we can, by reference to that totality,
22However, it should be emphasized that the predicative response, as we have described it above in §4,
is not necessarily committed to the existence of a sense-selecting extension operator. For, the two proofs
from the above paragraphs used the representation operator ∇a from §6 and the Predicative Typed Choice
Schema (4.8). As stressed in §4, the philosophical motivations for the Predicative Typed Comprehension
Schema (4.7) don’t necessarily extend to the Predicative Typed Choice Schema (4.8); and it goes with-
out saying that while the representation operator helps bring more of the model construction into the
object-language, it too is not necessarily built into the predicative response to the Russell-Myhill paradox.
Indeed, it is not even clear to me whether one can derive the existence of sense-selecting extension oper-
ators merely from the core of Church’s system (2.8), the Surjectivity Axiom (3.8), the Senses are Objects
Axiom (3.9), the Propositions as Fine-Grained as Objects Axiom (3.10), and the Predicative Typed Com-
prehension Schema (4.7). Thus the results of this section are only available to certain natural expansions of
the predicative perspective by choice principles or by a representation operator.
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characterize a larger totality of all whose members fall under it” ([31] p. 22, [26] pp. 149-150,
[27] pp. 195-196, [28] p. 533, [29] p. 316, cf. [79] p. 36, [80] p. 144). If one reads Dummett’s
use of “concept” as any formula Φ(x) with a free object variable x and if one reads his
“definite concept” as an entity of type et, then there is a comparatively tight match between
the formalization in (7.7) and Dummett’s own formulation of indefinite extensibility.23
Let’s now show that if ∂ is a sense-selecting extension operator (7.5) then the range rng(∂)
of this extension operator is formally indefinitely extensible (7.7), where of course the
range rng(∂) is the following formula with x a variable of type e and f a variable of type et:
(7.8) (rng(∂))(x) ≡ ∃ f ∂(f) = x
Fix h of type et such that h ⊆ rng(∂). Then one may show the following, which intuitively
says that ∂ admits a partial inverse:
(7.9) There is a γh of type e(et) such that for every g of type et with h(∂(g)) = 1, it is the
case that γh(∂(g)) = g.
Since the argument for (7.9) is routine, we relegate it to a footnote.24 By the definition
23That said, there are some differences. First, this formalization provides no insight into how, if at all, h˜ is
provided “by reference” to h. Second, on our explication of “definite”, it will follow that the definite concepts
are closed under boolean operations such as intersection, union, and complement. If one has the intuition
that “definite concepts” should be small in some sense, one will resist the claim that definite concepts are
closed under complementation. Finally, it should be noted that this general variety of formalization of
indefinite extensibility is of course not new: see for instance Shapiro-Wright [83] p. 266 and Priest [71] pp.
1264-1265.
24The first argument for (7.9) employs the representation function. So suppose that the sense-selecting
extension operator satisfies ∂(f) = ∇etf as in equation (7.2). Fix a parameter q of type et. Then one has
the following, wherein x has type e and f has type et:
(7.10) ∀ x ∃ ! f [(h(x) = 0 & f = q) ∨ (h(x) = 1 & ∇et(f) = x)]
Then by the Predicative Typed Comprehension Schema (4.6), there is γh of type e(et) such that
(7.11) ∀ x [(h(x) = 0 & γh(x) = q) ∨ (h(x) = 1 & ∇et(γh(x)) = x)]
To verify equation (7.9), suppose that h(∂(g)) = 1. Letting x = ∂(g) we have that h(x) = 1. Then
∇et(γh(x)) = x = ∂(g) = ∇etg. Then γh(x) = g and so γh(∂(g)) = g, which is what we wanted to show. The
second argument for (7.9) employs the Predicative Typed Choice Schema (4.8). Since h ⊆ rng(∂), we have
that ∀ x [h(x) = 1 → (∃ f ∂(f) = x)]. Then the definition of sense-selecting (7.5) implies that ∀ x [h(x) =
1 → (∃ f ∃ f ′ ∆et(f ′) = f ∧ f ′ = x)]. Trivially we then have ∀ x ∃ f ′ [h(x) = 1 → f ′ = x]. Then we may
apply the Predicative Typed Choice Schema (4.8) since the parameter h has type with degree 2 and the
type e(et)′ has degree 2. Doing this we get an entity βh of type e(et)′ such that ∀ x [h(x) = 1→ βh(x) = x].
Further, we claim that
(7.12) ∀ x ∃ f [h(x) = 1→ ∆et(βh(x)) = f ]
For, if h(x) = 1 then ∂(f) = x for some f of type et and hence ∆et(g
′) = f and g′ = x for some g′ of
type (et)′ by the definition of sense-selecting (7.5). Then βh(x) = x = g′ and so ∆et(βh(x)) = ∆et(g′) = f .
So indeed equation (7.12) holds. Further, we may apply the Predicative Typed Choice Schema (4.1) to this
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of degree in equation (4.5), note that γh has type with degree 2. Hence the following for-
mula ϕ(x, h, γh), where x is a variable of type e, contains only parameters of degree 2:
(7.14) ϕ(x, h, γh) ≡ (h(x) = 1 & (γh(x))(x) = 0)
Then by the Predicative Concept Comprehension Schema (4.7), there is gh of type et such
that
(7.15) gh(x) = 1⇐⇒ (h(x) = 1 & (γh(x))(x) = 0)
Then we claim that h(∂(gh)) = 0. For, suppose not. Then let y = ∂(gh) so that h(y) = 1.
Then by the earlier result (7.9) we have that γh(y) = γh(∂(gh)) = gh. Then the above
equation implies that
(7.16) gh(y) = 1⇐⇒ (γh(y))(y) = 0⇐⇒ gh(y) = 0
which is a contradiction. Hence indeed we have h(∂(gh)) = 0. Now, let p = ∂(gh), so that p
is a parameter of type e with degree 1. Then consider the following formula which has only
parameters of degree ≤ 2:
(7.17) ψ(x, h, p) ≡ (h(x) = 1 ∨ x = p)
Then by the Predicative Concept Comprehension Schema (4.7), there is h˜ of type et such
that
(7.18) h˜(x) = 1⇐⇒ (h(x) = 1 ∨ x = ∂(gh))
so that in terms of our subset notation (7.6), we have h ( h˜ ⊆ rng(∂) which completes
the verification that the range rng(∂) of a sense-selecting extension operator is formally
indefinitely extensible (7.7).
Let’s call the objects falling within the range rng(∂) of an extension operator ∂ the
extensions. In this terminology, Wehmeier’s observation about his consistent fragments of
the Grundgesetze was that they required that there were infinitely many non-extensions (cf.
[95] §4.2 pp. 326 ff, [96] §3 pp. 255 ff). Given the above discussion, one can see now that
this follows deductively from the formally indefinite extensibility of the range rng(∂) of an
extension operator ∂. For, suppose that there were only finitely many objects which were
equation since the parameters h, βh have types with degree 2 and since e(et) likewise has degree 2. Then we
obtain γh of type e(et) such that
(7.13) ∀ x [h(x) = 1→ ∆et(βh(x)) = γh(x)]
Let’s now verify equation (7.9). Suppose that g is of type et such that h(∂(g)) = 1. Let x = ∂(g), so
that h(x) = 1. By ∂(g) = x, we obtain ∆et(g
′) = g and g′ = x for some g′ of type (et)′ by the definition of
sense-selecting (7.5). Further by equation (7.13), we have ∆et(βh(x)) = γh(x). Then βh(x) = x = g
′ and
so g = ∆et(g
′) = ∆et(βh(x)) = γh(x) = γh(∂(g)), which is what we wanted to show.
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non-extensions, enumerated as q1, . . . , qk. Then consider the formula θ(x, q1, . . . , qk) with
free variable x of type e and parameters q1, . . . , qk of type e and hence degree ≤ 1:
(7.19) θ(x, q1, . . . , qk) ≡ (x 6= q1 ∧ · · · ∧ x 6= qk)
Then by the Predicative Concept Comprehension Schema (4.7), there is h of type et such
that
(7.20) h(x) = 1⇐⇒ (x 6= q1 ∧ · · · ∧ x 6= qk)
But by hypothesis, we have that h is coextensive with rng(∂), in that h(x) = 1 iff x is in
the range of the extension operator ∂. But then by the formal indefinite extensibility (7.7)
of rng(∂), there is h˜ of type et such that h ( h˜ ⊆ rng(∂), which contradicts that h = rng(∂).
Thus the supposition that there were only finitely many non-extensions must have been
wrong. Hence, the formal indefinite extensibility of the range of the extension operator
requires that there be infinitely many non-extensions.
As Wehmeier notes (cf. [95] §4.2 pp. 326 ff, [96] §3 pp. 255 ff), these considerations sug-
gest an apparent tension between these subsystems of the Grundgesetze and at least some
renditions of Frege’s logicism. For, sometimes logicism is described as the contention that
mathematical reasoning is discoverable in every domain of inquiry (cf. ([23] p. 138, cf. [22]
§VII p. 496, [20] p. 229). Presumably there are domains of inquiry (such a chemistry and
biology) in which there are comparatively few non-extensions (say, finitely many atoms or
organisms). In such domains of inquiry there simply isn’t “space enough” for an extension
operator as axiomatized by the predicative fragments of the Grundgesetze of the kind con-
sidered here. Besides this apparent tension, there is a more general reason to be concerned
about the problem of many non-extensions. For, this problem tells us that the presence of
an extension operator has consequences for the non-extensions. It’s natural to seek an expla-
nation for this– that is, one seeks an answer to the question: what is it about the extension
operator that results in it having consequences for the nature of the non-extensions?
But in the case where the extension operator is a sense-selecting extension operator, it
seems that there is a natural response to the problem of many non-extensions. For, if the
extension operator, applied to a concept, is a sense of that concept, then it is natural to expect
that there will be many senses which are not extensions. For, part of the explanatory power
of the Fregean doctrine of sense is that any given referent can be presented in a number of
different ways. Moreover, there is no reason to expect there to be any antecedently specified
finite bound on the number of different ways that a referent can be presented. Hence, because
a sense-selecting extension operator selects but one sense amongst many for each concept,
there will inevitably be numerous objects in these models that are not extensions. Of course,
this response to the problem of many non-extensions presupposes that one is thinking about
the entities of type a′ as entities similar to Fregean senses in the respect that any given
referent can be presented in a number of different ways. Even though Church himself was
motivated by the project of axiomatizing Fregean sense, obviously there is nothing written
into the axioms of Church’s intensional logic or the extensions thereof considered here which
forces one to adopt this presupposition.
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8 Conclusions
The last two sections have illustrated some of costs and benefits of the predicative response
to the Russell-Myhill paradox of propositions, at least when expanded by certain choice-like
principles or by the representation operators. In the previous section §7, we’ve developed
a response to the Wehmeier problem of many non-extensions: the solution simply is that
there are many non-extensions because the extension of a concept selects one sense from the
many which present a concept. But in section §6, we saw that the consistency proof for the
predicative response has some features which are not in the spirit of a fine-grained theory of
intensions. For, on this model, intensions of functions are only as injective as the functions
they present. Perhaps there are other model constructions which would not be committed
to this result, but that question is left unresolved by the work in this paper.
Likewise, for reasons of space we have been unable to compare and contrast the versions
of Church’s intensional logic studied here to other formalizations of Fregean sense given by
authors such as Chalmers, Horty, Moschovakis, and Tichy´ ([11], [47], [61], [90]), or to other
formal systems of fine-grained intensions due to Fox, Lappin, Parsons, and Thomason ([37],
[64], [89]). Finally, while we indicated in §3 how others like Anderson and Kaplan produced
models which yield responses to the formalized version of the Russell-Myhill paradox (3.7),
we do not pretend to have done any serious appraisal of the costs and benefits of these
proposals as compared with the predicative response. Rather, we have limited ourselves here
to merely setting out the predicative response in a clear manner. In addition to suggesting
a motivation for the restriction on the comprehension schema, our efforts in this paper have
been directed towards establishing the formal consistency of the predicative response to the
Russell-Myhill paradox of propositions.
9 Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition on Location of
Domains
In this brief appendix, we prove the Proposition on Location of Domains (5.11) from §5. For
ease of reference, we restate it here:
(5.11) For all n ≥ 1, both of the following hold:
(I) for all types a with ‖a‖ < n, there is a Σ1-formula in parameter µn such
that Da is the unique element of Lαn which satisfies this formula, wherein µn is
defined by µn = 〈ν1, . . . , νn, α0, α1, . . . , αn−1〉.
(II) for all types a with ‖a‖ = n, the set Da is a Σ˜`n-definable subset of Lαn inparameter µn.
The proof is by simultaneous induction on n ≥ 1. For n = 1, note that (I) holds vac-
uously. As for (II), first note that if a is a type with ‖a‖ = 1, then a is among the
types e, e′, e′′, . . . , t, t′, t′′, . . .. Now, if a = e or a = t, then part (II) follows trivially
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since α0 < α1 and so both α0 and the set {0, 1} are members of Lα1 and µ1 includes
the parameter α0 by definition. Suppose the result holds for a. Since O1 is a Σ˜`1-definablesubset of Lα1 in parameter ν1, it follows trivially that Da′ = O1 is Σ˜`1-definable subset of Lα1in the more complex parameter µ1. This completes the argument in the case n = 1.
Now suppose that the result holds for n, and we show it holds for n+1. For (I), suppose
that a is a type with ‖a‖ < n+1, say ‖a‖ = m. Then since Da is a definable subset of Lαm by
the induction hypothesis on part (II) for m, we may write Da = {x ∈ Lαm : Lαm |= ψ(x, µm)}
for some formula ψ. Hence Da is an element of Lαm+1 and a member of Lαn+1 . Then we
have that Da is the unique X in Lαn+1 which satisfies the following condition:
(9.1) (∀ x ∈ X ∩ Lαm Lαm |= ψ(x, µm)) & (∀ x ∈ Lαm (Lαm |= ψ(x, µm)→ x ∈ X))
Then since m < n+1 and the parameter µn+1 contains the parameter µm as well as the
ordinal αm, and since the map β 7→ Lβ is ∆1 in Lαn+1 (cf. [24] II.2.8 p. 70) and since the
satisfaction relation is likewise ∆1 (cf. [24] I.9.10 p. 41), this is a Σ1-condition in Lαn+1 in
parameter µn+1. Here we’re also appealing tacitly to the fact that the Σ1-formulas are closed
under bounded quantification in models Lα which satisfy Σ1-collection (cf. [24] Lemma I.11.6
p. 53). This completes the induction step for part (I) of of the proposition.
For the induction step for part (II), note that the types with degree n+1 are of the
form a′ or ab. Then we may do a subinduction on complexity of type. First suppose
that ‖a′‖ = n+1 and suppose that the result holds for a; we show it holds for a′. Since On+1
is Σ˜`n+1-definable subset of Lαn+1 in parameter νn+1, it follows trivially that Da′ = On+1 isa Σ˜`n+1-definable subset of Lαn+1 in the more complex parameter µn+1.Second suppose that ‖ab‖ = n+1, and suppose that the result holds for a, b; we show
it holds for ab. There are two subcases here. In the first subcase, suppose that ‖a‖ ≥ ‖b‖.
Then by the definition of degree in (4.5), we have that ‖a‖, ‖b‖ < ‖ab‖. Then if we let fnct(f)
abbreviate the Σ0-formula expressive of the graph f being functional, and fixing similar Σ0-
definitions of dom(f) = X and rng(f) ⊆ Y , then the set (DbDa) ∩ Lαn+1 is equal to
(9.2) {f ∈ Lαn+1 : fnct(f) & ∃ X, Y X = Da & dom(f) = X & Y = Db & rng(f) ⊆ Y }
Then by part (I), we have that this is a Σ˜1-definable subset of Lαn+1 in parameter µn+1.Now, as a second subcase, suppose the result holds for a, b and that ‖a‖ < ‖b‖, so that
by the definition of degree in (4.5) we have n+1 = ‖ab‖ = ‖b‖. Then Da is a member of Lαn+1
by part (I), while by the supposition that the result holds for b we have that Db is a Σ˜`n+1-
definable subset of Lαn+1 in parameter µn+1. Then (Db
Da) ∩ Lαn+1 is also a Σ˜`n+1-definable
subset of Lαn+1 in the parameter µn+1. For, we have the following definition of (Db
Da)∩Lαn+1 :
(9.3) {f ∈ Lαn+1 : Lαn+1 |= [fnct(f) & ∃ X X = Da & ∀ x ∈ X ∃ y ∈ Db 〈x, y〉 ∈ f ]}
Here we are appealing to part (I) applied to Da since ‖a‖ < n+1 in this subcase. Likewise, we
are appealing to the fact that the bounded quantification in the last conjunct does not move
us out of the complexity class Σ˜`n+1 in models of Σ˜`n+1-collection and Σ˜`n+1−1-separation.This finishes the induction step for (II). With this the inductive proof of the proposition is
finished.
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10 Appendix 2: Verification of the Satisfaction of Pred-
icative Comprehension
Here we prove the following theorem from §5:
(5.17) (Theorem on Consistency of Predicative Comprehension) For every intensional hi-
erarchy D (5.9), the associated intensional structure D models each instance of the
Predicative Typed Choice Schema (4.8) and hence each instance of the Predicative
Typed Comprehension Schema (4.6).
Further, we here prove this result for the language expanded by the representation func-
tions ∇a : Da → Da′ introduced in §6 (cf. circa (6.4)). As a first step towards approaching
the proof of this theorem, let’s first note an elementary result on terms. The terms in the
signature of an intensional structures consists simply of the closure of the constants 0,1 and
the variables under the extensional application symbols and the representation operations.
The presentation symbols and the intensional application symbols are not total and hence
are formally treated as relation symbols as opposed to function symbols. The type of a
term is defined inductively as follows: the truth-values 0, 1 have type t, the variables have
the type that they are given initially, and if τ has type ab and σ has type a, then τ(σ)
or e-appab(τ, σ) has type b; and if τ has type a then ∇a(τ) has type a′. Then we have the
following elementary result:
(10.1) (Proposition that Terms do not Raise Degree). Suppose that τ(x1, . . . , xk) is a term
in the signature of intensional structures with all free variables displayed such that the
type of each variable xi has degree ≤ n. Then the type of the term τ has degree ≤ n.
The proof is by induction on the complexity of the term. Clearly this is true in the case of the
truth-values and the variables. Suppose it holds for τ(x1, . . . , xk) and σ(x1, . . . , xk); we must
show it is the case for e-appab(τ, σ) and∇a(τ). First consider the case of e-appab(τ, σ). Then τ
has type ab and σ has type a, and each has type with degree ≤ n by the induction hypothesis.
There are two cases to consider, corresponding to the two clauses in the definition of ‖ab‖
in (4.5). First suppose that ‖a‖ ≥ ‖b‖. Then one has that ‖b‖ ≤ ‖a‖ ≤ n, which is what we
wanted to show since the type of e-appab(τ, σ) is b. Second suppose that ‖a‖ < ‖b‖. Then we
have that ‖b‖ = ‖ab‖ ≤ n, which is again what we wanted to show. Finally, consider the case
of ∇a(τ). Then τ has type a, and it has degree ≤ n by induction hypothesis. Then ∇a(τ)
has type a′ and so ‖a′‖ = ‖a‖ ≤ n by the definition of degree of ‖a′‖ in (4.5). This is why
terms do not raise degree, or why (10.1) holds.
Relatedly, as a preliminary step, let’s establish the following result about the complexity
of the functions on intensional structures induced by terms:
(10.2) (Proposition on Complexity of Terms) Suppose that τ(u) ≡ τ(u1, . . . , uj) is a term
with all free variables displayed where ui has type di. Since terms don’t raise de-
gree (10.1), τ has type with degree d with ‖d‖ ≤ m = max{‖d1‖, . . . , ‖dj‖}. Then τ
induces a function τD : Dd1 × · · · ×Ddj → Dd whose graph is Σ˜Lαm`m -definable.
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Clearly this is the case if the term is variable. Now for the induction step suppose that the
result holds for τ and σ; we must show it holds for ρ(u) ≡ e-appe1e2(τ(u), σ(u)). Then τ(u)
has type e1e2 and σ(u) has type e1. Since terms don’t raise degree (10.1), it follows
that ‖e1e2‖, ‖e1‖ are all less than or equal to m = max{‖d1‖, . . . , ‖dj‖}, and from this
we infer that ‖e2‖ ≤ ‖e1e2‖ ≤ m as well. Then ρD : Dd1 × · · · ×Ddj → De2 has the following
graph:
{(u, u) ∈ Dd1 × · · · ×Ddj ×De2 : ∃ y ∈ De1 ∃ z ∈ De1e2
σD(u) = y & τD(u) = z & 〈y, u〉 ∈ z}(10.3)
This is Σ˜Lαm`m -definable by the Location of Domains (5.11) since we have that ‖e1‖, ‖e2‖, ‖e1e2‖ ≤m. For the final induction step, suppose that the result holds for τ ; we must show it
holds for ∇a(τ). Then τ has type a, and since terms don’t raise degree (10.1), it follows
that ‖a‖ ≤ m. Then the graph of τD is Σ˜Lαmm -definable by induction hypothesis. Recallfrom the discussion in §6 that the representation function ∇a is interpreted on intensional
structures D by the function ι‖a‖ from the definition of an intensional hierarchy (5.9). How-
ever, this was by definition Σ˜Lα‖a‖‖a‖ -definable (cf. clause (iii) of the definition of an intensional
position (5.8)). Since ‖a‖ ≤ m, we then have that the composition ι‖a‖ ◦ τD is clearly also
Σ˜Lαmm -definable. This finishes the proof of result on the complexity of terms (10.2).Now let’s consider what kinds of symbols can appear in a formula covered by the Pred-
icative Typed Choice Schema (4.8). Suppose that the formula ϕ(x, y, z1, . . . , zk) is a formula
with all free variables displayed and with free variable x of type a, y of type b, and in addi-
tion variable zi has type ci with ‖ci‖ ≤ ‖ab‖ and all the bound variables in ϕ(x, y, z1, . . . , zk)
have type c with ‖c‖ < ‖ab‖. Let ‖ab‖ = n + 1. There are then two cases to consider,
corresponding to the split in cases in the definition of the degree ‖ab‖ in (4.5). If ‖a‖ ≥ ‖b‖,
then n + 1 = ‖ab‖ = ‖a‖ + 1 and so ‖b‖ ≤ ‖a‖ ≤ n. Further, if we split the parameter
variables z1, . . . , zk into those that have type with degree n + 1 and those that have type
with degree ≤ n, then we can write the formula in question as:
(10.4) (First Configuration): ϕ(x, y, v1, . . . , vm, z1, . . . , zk) is a formula with all free variables
displayed and with free variable x of type a with ‖a‖ ≤ n, y of type b with ‖b‖ ≤ n,
and in addition variable vi has type ai with ‖ai‖ ≤ n and variable zi has type ci
with ‖ci‖ = n+1 and all the bound variables in the formula have type c with ‖c‖ ≤ n.
Alternatively, in the other case, we have ‖a‖ < ‖b‖ and n + 1 = ‖ab‖ = ‖b‖. If we again
split the parameter variables z1, . . . , zk into those that have type with degree n+1 and those
that have type with degree ≤ n, then we can write the formula in question as:
(10.5) (Second Configuration): ϕ(x, v1, . . . , vm, y, z1, . . . , zk) is a formula with all free vari-
ables displayed and with free variable x of type a with ‖a‖ ≤ n, y of type b with ‖b‖ =
n+1, and in addition variable vi has type ai with ‖ai‖ ≤ n and variable zi has type ci
with ‖ci‖ = n+1 and all the bound variables in the formula have type c with ‖c‖ ≤ n.
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For ease of future reference, we call these two kinds of formulas which can feature in the
Predicative Typed Choice Schema (4.8) the “first configuration” and the “second configura-
tion”.
The plan in what follows is to show that the Predicative Typed Choice Schema (4.8)
holds for formulas in the second configuration (10.5), and then to show it for formulas
in the first configuration (10.4). This first step is done by proving a result connecting
the satisfaction of a formula in the second configuration to a certain level of definabil-
ity in the constructible hierarchy. To build up to the statement of this result, suppose
that ϕ(x, v1, . . . , vm, y, z1, . . . , zk) is in the second configuration (10.5). Then any subformula
of this formula has the form
(10.6) ψ(x, v1, . . . , vm, vm+1, . . . vm+m′ , y, z1, . . . , zk)
where the variable vi for i > m has type ai with degree ≤ n. Let’s abbreviate v =
〈v1, . . . , vm, vm+1, . . . vm+m′〉 and let’s abbreviate
(10.7) Da = Da1 × · · · ×Dam+m′ , Dc = Dc1 × · · · ×Dck
Note that since ‖a‖, ‖ai‖ ≤ n, it follows from the Location of Domains (5.11), we have
that Da×Da is a member of Lαn+1 . However, since ‖b‖, ‖ci‖ = n+ 1, we have that Db×Dc
is a Σ˜Lαn+1`n+1 -definable subset of Lαn+1 . Having put this terminology in place, let’s now showthat:
(10.8) (Proposition on Complexity of Satisfaction, Second Configuration) For every inten-
sional hierarchyD with induced intensional structure D and every subformula ψ(x, v, y, z)
of a formula in the second configuration (10.5), the following set is Σ˜Lαn+1`n+1 -definable:
[ψ]D = {(x, v, y, z) ∈ Da ×Da ×Db ×Dc : D |= ψ(x, v, y, z)}
We establish this by induction on the complexity of the subformula. By pushing all the
negations to the inside, it suffices to show that the result holds for atomics, negated atom-
ics, and is closed under conjunctions, disjunctions, existential quantification, and universal
quantification. Let’s begin with the atomic case, considering the negated atomic cases along
the way. The atomic formulas in intensional structures have three possible forms, namely:
(10.9) τ = σ, ∆d(τ) = σ, i-appc0d0(τ, σ) = ρ
where τ, σ, ρ are terms. These are the only possible subformulas because technically, the
second is shorthand for the binary atomic formula ∆d(τ, σ) and the third is shorthand for
the associated ternary atomic relation (cf. discussion circa equations (5.13) and (5.14)).
Since τ, σ, ρ appear in a formula in the second configuration (10.5), the free variables in these
terms τ, σ, ρ have types with degree ≤ n + 1 and since terms don’t raise degree (10.1), it
follows that the respective types e1, e2, e3 of τ, σ, ρ are also such that ‖e1‖, ‖e2‖, ‖e3‖ ≤ n+1.
From this it follows in turn that ‖d‖ ≤ n+ 1 and ‖c0‖, ‖d0‖ ≤ ‖c0d0‖ = ‖(c0d0)′‖ ≤ n+ 1.
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Let’s consider first the case of equality between terms, that is, atomic formulas of the
form
(10.10) ψ(x, v, y, z) ≡ τ(x, v, y, z) = σ(x, v, y, z)
Then we have that
(x, v, y, z) ∈ [ψ]D ⇐⇒ ∃ z1 ∈ De1 ,∃ z2 ∈ De2 τ(x, v, y, z) = z1
& σ(x, v, y, z) = z2 & z1 = z2(10.11)
which is Σ˜Lαn+1`n+1 -definable by the result on the complexity of terms (10.2). Similarly we havethat
(x, v, y, z) ∈ [¬ψ]D ⇐⇒ ∃ z1 ∈ De1 ,∃ z2 ∈ De2 τ(x, v, y, z) = z1
& σ(x, v, y, z) = z2 & z1 6= z2(10.12)
which is Σ˜Lαn+1`n+1 -definable for the same reasons.Now let’s consider the case of the presentation symbols, that is atomic formulas of the
form
(10.13) ψ(x, v, y, z) ≡ ∆d(τ(x, v, y, z)) = σ(x, v, y, z)
Then [ψ]D is Σ˜Lαn+1`n+1 -definable because we have the following biconditional and because ‖d‖ ≤
n+1 implies that pi‖d‖ is Σ˜Lαn+1`n+1 -definable:
(x, v, y, z) ∈ [ψ]D ⇐⇒ ∃ z1 ∈ De1 ,∃ z2 ∈ De2 τ(x, v, y, z) = z1
& σ(x, v, y, z) = z2 & pi‖d‖(z1) = z2(10.14)
Further, by using the fact that Oj \ pi−1j (Lαj) was Σ˜Lαj`j -definable for all j ≥ 1 (cf. clause (v)
of the definition of an intensional position (5.8)) and that ‖d‖ ≤ n+ 1, we have that
(x, v, y, z) ∈ [¬ψ]D ⇐⇒ ∃ z1 ∈ De1 ,∃ z2 ∈ De2 , ∃ z3 ∈ Lαn+1
τ(x, v, y, z) = z1 & σ(x, v, y, z) = z2(10.15)
& (z1 ∈ O‖d‖ \ pi−1‖d‖(Lα‖d‖)) ∨ (pi‖d‖(z1) = z3 & z2 6= z3)
As the final atomic case, consider the case of intensional application:
(10.17) ψ(x, v, y, z) ≡ i-appc0d0(τ(x, v, y, z), σ(x, v, y, z)) = ρ(x, v, y, z)
Then the type e1 of τ must be (c0d0)
′ and the type e2 of σ must be c′0. Then we have
(x, v, y, z) ∈ [ψ]D ⇐⇒ ∃ z1 ∈ D(c0d0)′ ,∃ z2 ∈ Dc′0 ,∃ z3 ∈ Dd′0
τ(x, v, y, z) = z1 & σ(x, v, y, z) = z2 & ρ(x, v, y, z) = z3
& ι‖d0‖((pi‖c0d0‖(z1))(pi‖c0‖(z2)) = z3(10.18)
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Since ‖c0‖, ‖d0‖ ≤ ‖c0d0‖ = ‖(c0d0)′‖ ≤ n+1, we have that pi‖c0d0‖, pi‖c0‖, ι‖d0‖ are all Σ˜Lαn+1`n+1 -definable. Finally, for the negation, we may argue as follows, again appealing to the fact that
in the definition of an intensional position we required that the set Oj \ pi−1j (Lαj) was Σ˜Lαj`j -
definable for all j ≥ 1 (cf. clause (v) of the definition of an intensional position (5.8)):
(x, v, y, z) ∈ [¬ψ]D ⇐⇒ ∃ z1 ∈ D(c0d0)′ ,∃ z2 ∈ Dc′0 ,∃ z3 ∈ Dd′0 ,∃ z4 ∈ Lαn+1
τ(x, v, y, z) = z1 & σ(x, v, y, z) = z2 & ρ(x, v, y, z) = z3
∧[(z1 ∈ O‖c0d0‖ \ pi−1‖c0d0‖(Lα‖c0d0‖))
∨ (z2 ∈ O‖c0‖ \ pi−1‖c0‖(Lα‖c0‖))(10.19)
∨ (ι‖d0‖((pi‖c0d0‖(z1))(pi‖c0‖(z2)) = z4 & z4 6= z3)]
This completes the base cases of the inductive argument for (10.8). Since Σ˜Lαn+1`n+1 -definability is closed under finite intersections and unions, the inductive steps for conjunc-
tion and disjunction are trivial. Let us then consider the case of universal quantification.
Suppose that the result holds for ψ(x, v, v, y, z) and let us show it holds for θ(x, v, y, z) ≡
∀ v0 ψ(x, v, v0, y, z). Since this is a subformula of a formula in the second configuration (10.5),
it follows the bound variable v0 has a type a0 with degree ≤ n. Then by part (ii) of the
result on Locations of Domains (5.11), it follows that X = Da0 is a Σ˜Lαn+11 -condition. Thenone has that
(10.21) (x, v, y, z) ∈ [θ]D ⇐⇒ ∃ X X = Da0 & ∀ v0 ∈ X (x, v0, v, y, z) ∈ [ψ]D
so that [θ]D is likewise Σ˜Lαn+1`n+1 -definable since Σ˜Lαn+1`n+1 -definability is closed under boundedquantification in models Lαn+1 of Σ`n+1-collection and Σ`n+1−1-separation. A similar argu-
ment holds in the case of the existential quantifier, but is even easier since there we do
not have to appeal to this result about closure under bounded quantification. This finishes
the result on the complexity of satisfaction in the case of a formula which is in the second
configuration (10.8).
Now let us finally establish that the Predicative Typed Choice Schema (4.6) holds on
intensional structures, at first with respect to formulas in the second configuration (10.5).
Suppose that the antecedent holds:
(10.22) D |= ∀ x ∃ y ϕ(x, p1, . . . , pm, y, q1, . . . , qk)
where ϕ(x, v1, . . . , vm, y, z1, . . . zk) is in the second configuration (10.5). Consider the follow-
ing relation:
(10.23) R(x, y) ≡ [x ∈ Da & y ∈ Db & D |= ϕ(x, p1, . . . , pm, y, q1, . . . , qk)]
Then by the result on the complexity of satisfaction (10.8), one has thatR is Σ˜Lαn+1`n+1 -definable.And by equation (10.22), one has that
(10.24) Lαn+1 |= ∀ x ∈ Da ∃ y R(x, y)
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By the uniformization theorem (cf. [50] Theorem 3.1 p. 256 and Lemma 2.15 p. 255;
[24] Theorem 4.5 p. 269, and “weak uniformization” in [94]), choose a Σ˜Lαn+1`n+1 -definablerelation R′ ⊆ R such that
(10.25) Lαn+1 |= [∀ x (∃ y R(x, y))→ (∃ ! y R′(x, y))]
Then by equation (10.24), one has that R′ is the graph of a function h : Da → Db. Since this
graph is Σ˜Lαn+1`n+1 -definable with domain Da an element of Lαn+1 , by Replacement (cf. [24]Lemma I.11.7 p. 53) one has that it is an element of Lαn+1 = Lα‖ab‖ . Then h is an element
of the domain DDab ∩ Lα‖ab‖ = Dab (cf. the third clause of equation (5.10)). Hence, we’ve
shown that there is h in Dab such that
(10.26) D |= ∀ x ϕ(x, p1, . . . , pm, h(x), q1, . . . , qk)
which is what we were required to show in the consequent of the Predicative Typed Choice
Schema (4.6).
We’ve verified that the Predicative Typed Choice Schema (4.6) holds on intensional
structures, at least with respect to formulas in the second configuration (10.5). Let’s now
argue that the same holds with respect to formulas in the first configuration (10.4). Suppose
that
(10.27) D |= ∀ x ∃ y ϕ(x, y, p1, . . . , pm, q1, . . . , qk)
where ϕ(x, y, v1, . . . , vm, z1, . . . zk) is in the first configuration (10.4). Then consider the
following, where w is a variable of type ab with degree n + 1 and x1, x2 are variables of
type a:
(10.28) ψ(x,w, p, q) ≡ (∀ x1, x2 w(x1) = w(x2)) & (∃ x1, y (w(x1) = y & ϕ(x, y, p, q)))
Intuitively this formula ψ is saying that w is a constant function of type ab and its constant
value is a witness to ϕ. Now ψ is in the second configuration (10.5), and we can verify by
hand that for every element y of Db there is a constant function of type ab whose constant
value is y. For, if y ∈ Lα‖b‖ then {〈x1, y〉 : x1 ∈ Da} is in Lα‖ab‖ . Then by Predicative
Typed Choice Schema (4.6) applied to ψ, we have that there is an element h of type a(ab)
such that D |= ∀ x ψ(x, h(x), p1, . . . , pm, q1, . . . , qk). Note that since ‖ab‖ = n+ 1 = ‖a(ab)‖
we have that h is in Lαn+1 . Then the function g : Da → Db such that g(x) = (h(x))(x) is
in Lαn+1 by Σ0-separation since
(10.29) g = {〈x, y〉 ∈ Da ×Db : 〈x, 〈x, y〉〉 ∈ h}
We’ve now shown that g is an element of Dab and by construction we have
(10.30) D |= ∀ x ϕ(x, g(x), p1, . . . , pm, q1, . . . , qk)
so that we also have that Predicative Typed Choice Schema (4.6) holds on intensional struc-
tures, regardless of which of the two configurations we are in.
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